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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays on firm-level frictions and their aggregate
implications. The first two chapters show that inter-firm lending plays an important
role in business cycle fluctuations. In Chapter I, I theoretically investigate the role
of supplier credit relationships in propagating and amplifying small shocks using a
stylized model of inter-firm trade and lending. I build a network model of the economy
in which trade in intermediate goods is financed by supplier credit. In the model, a
financial shock to one firm affects its ability to make payments to its suppliers. The
credit linkages between firms then transmit financial shocks across firms, amplifying
their effects on aggregate output.
In Chapter II, I embed this mechanism into a more general macroeconomic frame-
work to study empirically the role that inter-firm credit plays in the business cycle.
To calibrate the model, I construct a proxy of inter-industry credit flows from firm-
and industry-level data. I find that the credit network of the US accounts for 22
percent of the fall in GDP occurring from an aggregate financial shock. Finally, I
use a structural factor approach to estimate the shocks which affected US industrial
production (IP) industries from 1997-2013. I find that most aggregate volatility in IP
v
was driven by aggregate liquidity shocks and idiosyncratic productivity shocks, and
that the credit network of IP industries generated 17 percent of observed aggregate
volatility. During the recent recession, three-quarters of the drop in aggregate IP was
due to an aggregate financial shock
Chapter III presents a theoretical investigation of the long-run relationship be-
tween international trade and unemployment. I develop and analyze a static general
equilibrium model with labor market frictions and heterogeneous firms in which firms
can engage in cross-border hiring by employing labor domestically or from abroad.
This chapter outlines the conditions on the model parameters under which unem-
ployment rises or falls after trade liberalization, and demonstrates that models in the
literature which ignore cross-border hiring likely underestimate the upward force of
trade liberalization on unemployment.
vi
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1Chapter 1
Inter-Firm Credit and the Propagation of
Financial Distress
1.1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis and ensuing recession have underscored the importance of
external finance for the real economy. Generally, firms obtain most of their short-
term external financing from their suppliers, in the form of delayed payment terms
for their purchases. In spite of its importance, the aggregate implications of these
lending relationships remain poorly understood.
In this chapter, I show that inter-firm lending can transmit financial distress across
firms and amplifying its aggregate effects. To this end, I introduce supplier credit
into a network model of the economy and analytically show that the credit network
of an economy amplifies the effects of financial shocks. I provide intuition with a
stylized model in which trade in intermediate goods is financed by supplier credit. In
this model, a shock to one firm’s liquid funds reduces its ability to make payments
to its suppliers. The credit linkages between firms and their suppliers thus propagate
the firm-level shock across the network, amplifying its aggregate effects.
The credit linkages that I model take the form of trade credit, or delayed payment
terms, that suppliers of intermediate goods often extend to their customers. Trade
credit is the single most important source of short-term external finance for firms,
and facilitates most inter-firm trade. In the US, trade credit was three times as
2large as bank loans and fifteen times as large as commercial paper outstanding on
the aggregate balance sheet of non-financial corporations in 2012. In most OECD
countries, trade credit accounts for more than half of firms short-term liabilities and
more than one-third of their total liabilities. All of these facts point to the presence
of strong credit linkages between non-financial firms.
An important feature of trade credit is that it leaves suppliers exposed to the
financial distress of their customers. A notable example of this is the US automo-
tive industry in 2008, when the Big Three automakers (Chrysler, Ford, and General
Motors) faced an acute shortage of liquidity. While Ford did not require a bailout
from the US government itself, it requested one on behalf of its competitors, fearing
that a bankruptcy by Chrysler or General Motors would transfer the liquidity short-
age to their common suppliers, as the money owed to them could not be paid until
they exited bankruptcy. This episode suggests that when firms play a dual role of
supplier and creditor, shocks may not only affect trade directly, but may also affect
the availability of liquidity to finance trade.
There is growing evidence to suggest that this intuition is empirically relevant. A
number of studies - including Boissay and Gropp (2012), Jacobson and von Schedvin
(2015), and Raddatz (2010) - have found that firm- and industry-level trade credit
linkages propagate financial shocks from firms to their suppliers. In spite of this
evidence, the macroeconomic implications of trade credit have been largely overlooked
in the literature. I therefore develop a framework for understanding how inter-firm
trade and credit interact in response to credit conditions.
I consider an economy similar to that of Bigio and La’O (2015), in which firms are
organized in a production network and trade intermediate goods with one another.
Limited enforcement problems require firms to make cash-in-advance payments to
their suppliers before production takes place. However, firms can delay part of these
3payments by borrowing from their suppliers. I assume that, to obtain this credit,
a firm can credibly pledge some fraction of its revenue to repay its suppliers. Im-
portantly, this implies that the cash-in-advance payments collected by each firm are
endogenous to the model, and depend on the prices of its customers’ goods. As it
turns out, endogenous changes in firms’ cash-in-advance constraints are crucial for
how the economy behaves in response to shocks.
When one firm is hit with an adverse shock to its cash on hand, there are two
channels by which other firms in the economy are affected. First is the standard
input-output channel, which has been the focus of studies such as Acemoglu et al.
(2012) and Bigio and LaO (2015): the shocked firm cuts back on production, reducing
the supply of its good to its customers. Second is a new credit linkage channel in
which the shock disrupts the cash flow from firms to their suppliers. That is, when
the shocked firm cuts back on production, the price of its good rises. This increases
the collateral value of its receivables, allowing the firm to reduce the cash-in-advance
payments it makes to its suppliers. With less cash on hand, these suppliers may
themselves be forced to cut back on their own production. Thus, the credit linkages
propagate the shock up the production chain, amplifying the fall in aggregate output.
Related Literature
This paper contributes to several strands of the literature. A growing literature
examines how network effects across firms can generate aggregate fluctuatinos from
idiosyncratic shocks. Much of this literature builds on the multi-sector real business
cycle model of Long and Plosser (1983). Most notably, these include Acemoglu et al.
(2012), Shea (2002), Dupor (1999), Horvath (1998), Horvath (2000), and Acemoglu et
al. (2015). These studies all focus on the role of input-output linkages between firms.
Input-specificity in the production of intermediate goods prevents firms from easily
4switching suppliers or customers in response to productivity shocks. However, most
of this literature do not model how trade in intermediate goods is financed. Indeed,
most abstract away from financial frictions, leaving no role for financial factors in
aggregate fluctuations.
A notable work to which this paper is closely related is that of Bigio and La’O
(2015), who examine the role of financial frictions in the context of an input-output
network. They find that the input-output structure of an economy is an important
determinant of the aggregate impact of firm-level financial shocks. However, they
do not explicitly model any credit relationships between firms; the cash-in-advance
constraints faced by firms are therefore fixed exogenously. In contrast, I explicitly
model these credit relationships, in turn endogenizing these constraints. Moreover,
I show that the structure of the credit network of an economy is also an important
determinant of the aggregate impact of financial shocks.
There is a growing literature on origins of trade credit and its implications for the
transmission of shocks. A question which was once the focus of this literature is why
trade credit exists when there are financial intermediaries who specialize in lending?
Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) attribute this to a monitoring advantage that suppliers
have over banks which allows them to lend to a customer when a bank will not.
They find that, in a setting in with a moral hazard problem, the optimal trade credit
contract between supplier and customer is one in which the credit limit is proportional
to the customer’s revenue. In addition, they assert that firms will grant credit to their
customers, even when they themselves are liquidity constrained, because trade credit
can be collateralized for bank borrowing. Their results are line with evidence of trade
credit use presented in Petersen and Rajan (1997). A number of studies have looked
at how trade credit relationships transmit financial distress across trading firms. For
example, Boissay and Gropp (2013) find evidence that firms pass over a fifth of their
5liquidty shocks to their firms via their trade credit linkages: an increase in the default
probability by one firm increases its suppliers chance of defaulting by 0.2%. Jacobson
and von Schedvin (2015) both use firm-level data to show that firms pass a significant
fraction of their financial shocks to their suppliers via trade credit lending. Barrot
(2015) examines data on trucking firms in France and finds that delayed payment
terms are associated with greater financial distress. Raddatz (2010) shows that, even
controlling for input-output linkages, greater intensity of trade credit use linking two
industries increases their correlation in output growth. In my appendix, I follow
a strategy similar to that of Raddatz (2010) to test my model’s implications for
the comovement of sectoral output growth, using industry- and firm-level data. My
empirical findings are in line with the literature: even when accounting for the (direct
and indirect) input-output linkages between two industries, a model-based measure
of the credit linkages between industry-pairs increases the cross-sectional correlation
of their output growth. Furthermore, I utilize a theoretical framework to assess the
aggregate implications these findings.
A growing empirical literature tries to evaluate the origins of aggregate fluctu-
ations by measuring the contribution of idiosyncratic versus aggregate shocks. In
this context, the seminal work of Gabaix (2011) examined the role of granularity
in the firm size distribution. Taking cue from the network literature, a few stud-
ies have incorporated input-output linkages as a mechanism by which idiosyncratic
shocks may account for larger portion of fluctuations. Broadly speaking, there are
two approaches: a more structural approach (e.g. Horvath (2000)) and a more sta-
tistical approach. Foerster et al. (2011) and Stella (2014) bridge these approaches
using structural and factor approaches together; they account for the effects of input-
output linkages in propagating idiosyncratic shocks. My empirical approach follows
the same methodology, but uses additional data on industry employment growth to
6decompose the data into an additional source of fluctuations - financial shocks. The
presence of credit linkages between firms implies a greater role for financial shocks
in driving the business cycle. I show that failing to account for the credit linkages
created by trade credit underestimates the importance of idiosyncratic shocks, and
over-attributes aggregate volatility to aggregate productivity shocks. I also explic-
itly estimate the contribution of the production and credit networks US industrial
production in generating aggregate volatility.
Jermann and Quadrini (2012) evaluate the importance of financial shocks by ex-
plicitly modelling the tradeoff between debt and equity financing. They find these
shocks explain about half of observed aggregate volatility in the US. My paper, which
excludes equity financing, produces empirical results in line with theirs by accounting
for the importace of trade credit in financing firms’ working capital.
1.2 Stylized Model: Vertical Production Structure
In this section introduce and analyze the stylized model to build intuition. The
simplicity of the production structure of the economy and preferences of the household
permits closed-form expressions for equilibrium variables. I will later generalize both
the production structure and preferences.
There is one time period, consisting of two parts. At the beginning of the period,
contracts are signed. At the end of the period, production takes place and contracts
are settled. There are three types of agents: a representative household, firms, and
a bank. There are M goods, each produced by a continuum of competitive firms
with constant returns-to-scale in production. We can therefore consider each good as
being produced by a representative, price-taking firm. Each good can be consumed
by the household or used in the production of other goods.
71.2.1 Representative Household
The representative household supplies labor competitively to firms and consumes a
final consumption good. . It has preferences over consumption C and labor N given
by U(C,N).
U(C,N) = log C −N
Later I will generalize the preferences. Let w denote the competitive wage earned
from working, and pii the profit earned by firm i. The household chooses how much
to work and how much of each good to consume to maximize its utility subject to
the following budget constraint.
C = wN +
M∑
i=1
pii (1.1)
The household’s optimality condition is given by
V ′(N)
U ′(C)
= w (1.2)
This equates the competitive wage with the marginal rate of substitution between
labor and consumption.
1.2.2 Firms
There are M firms who each produce a different good. Suppose for now that firms
are arranged in a supply chain, where each firm produces an intermediate good for
one other firm. The last firm in the chain produces the consumption good, which it
sells to the household. Firms are indexed by their order in the supply chain, with
i = M denoting the producer of the final good. The flow of goods is depicted below.
Firm 1 → Firm 2 → · · · → Firm M → Household
8Firms are price-takers. The production technology of firm i is Cobb-Douglas over
labor and intermediate goods.
xi =

zin
ηi
i for i = 1
zinix
(1−ηi)
i−1 for i > 1
Here, xi denotes firm i’s output, ni its labor use, and xi−1 its use of good i − 1.
Parameter zi denotes firm i’s total factor productivity, ηi the share of labor in its
production, and ωi,i−1 the use of good i− 1 in firm i’s production. Let ps denote the
price of good s. The value of the sales from firm s to firm c is then psxcs.
Limited enforcement problems create a need for ex ante liquidity. The household
cannot force any debt repayment. Therefore, firm i must pay the full value of wage
bill, wni, up front to the household before production takes place. In addition, each
firm i must pay for its intermediate goods purchases, pi−1xi−1 up front to its supplier.
Thus, firms are required to have some funds at the beginning of the period before
any revenue is realized.
Firm i can delay payment to its supplier by borrowing some amount τi−1 from
its supplier. This represents the trade credit loan given from i− 1 to i. In addition,
each firm can obtain a cash loan bi from the bank. The net payment that firm i− 1
receives from its customer at the beginning of the period is therefore pi−1xi−1 − τi−1.
Firm i’s cash-in-advance constraint takes the form
wni︸︷︷︸
wage bill
+ pi−1xi−1 − τi−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
net CIA payment to supplier
≤ bi︸︷︷︸
bank loan
+ pixi − τi︸ ︷︷ ︸
net CIA from customer
This constraint states that the amount of cash that firm i is required to have in order
to employ ni units of labor and purchase xi−1 units of intermediate good i − 1, is
bounded by the amount of cash that firm i can collect at the beginning of the period.
Note that trade credit appears on both sides of the cash-in-advance: a loan from its
9supplier increases firm i’s liquidity, but a loan to its customer reduces its liquidity
by reducing the cash-in-advance payment it collects. There is therefore a one-to-one
relation between the amount of cash-in-advance a firm can collect from its customer
and the size of the trade credit loan it gives its customer.
Firms face borrowing constraints on the size of loans they can obtain from their
suppliers and the bank. In particular, firm i can obtain the loan bi from the bank at
the beginning of the period by pledging a fraction Bi of its total end-of-the-period
revenue pixi, and a fraction α of its accounts receivable τi+1, where α  (0, 1]. Thus,
firm i faces a bank borrowing constraint of the form
bi ≤ Bipixi + ατi
Parameters Bi and α provide an exogenous source of liquidity to each firm, and
represent the severity of the agency problem between firm i and the bank. I will
later show that α parameterizes the degree of substitutability between bank credit
and cash-in-advance payments from customers. I assume that bi is chosen by firm i,
which implies that these bank borrowing constraints will bind in equilibrium as each
firm obtains the maximum bank loan possible.
In addition, firm i can pledge a fraction θi,i−1 of its end-of-the-period revenue to
repay its supplier. Then the trade credit loan is bounded by the collateral value of
firm i’s output
τi−1 ≤ θi,i−1pixi
The parameter θi,i−1 is a reduced-form representation of the limited ability of firms
to delay payment to their suppliers. The precise limited enforcement problem which
produces this borrowing constraint is described in detail in Appendix A1. Because
firms can collateralize their trade credit (accounts receivable) for bank borrowing (i.e.
10
α > 0), they find it optimal to borrow as much as possible from suppliers and the
bank. Hence, both the trade credit and bank borrowing constraints bind for all firms
in equilibrium. A detailed derivation of this result is given in Appendix A2.1
Given the binding borrowing and constraints, we can now re-write firm i’s cash-
in-advance constraint as
wni + pi−1xi−1 ≤ χipixi︸ ︷︷ ︸
liquid funds
(1.3)
where
χi ≡ bi
pixi
+
τi−1
pixi︸ ︷︷ ︸
debt/revenue ratio
+ 1− τi
pixi︸ ︷︷ ︸
cash/revenue ratio
This constraint says that a firm’s expenditure on inputs is bounded by the value of
its liquid funds. The variable χi describes the tightness of firm i’s cash-in-advance
constraint, and will play a key role in the mechanism of the model. The tightness of a
firm’s cash-in-advance constraint is comprised of the firm’s debt-to-revenue ratio and
its cash-to-revenue. These describe how much of the firm’s revenue is financed by debt,
and how much of its revenue is collected as a cash-in-advance payment, respectively.
Notice that χi is decreasing in
τi
pixi
, the amount of i’s output sold on credit: the more
credit that i gives its customer, the less cash it collects at the beginning of the period.
1Even if firms could not collateralize their accounts receivables, perfect competition amongst
firms in an industry would imply that supplier credit borrowing constraints bind in equilibrium,
under some benign assumptions. Suppose that the pledgeability of revenue is common across all
firms within an industry. Also suppose that before signing trade and debt contracts, firms anticipate
that they may be liquidity-constrained in equilibrium. Finally, suppose also that firms can compete
not only in price but also in the length of payment terms. Then competition amongst suppliers in
industry i will bid up the trade credit to the maximium that each firm in i can offer their customers
in i+ 1. This maximum is pinned down by the moral hazard problem at θi+1,ipi+1xi+1. (More than
this, and customers would simply pocket the loan). Thus, in equilibrium, firms in a given industry
will all sell at the same price and offer the maximum trade credit terms, implying that borrowing
constraints bind. In this setting, the allocation of liquidity (cash) across firms would be ex ante
efficient (at the beginning of the period), but ex post inefficient (at the end of the period).
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We can re-write χi using firms’ binding borrowing constraints to replace τi and bi.
χi = Bi + θi,i−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
debt/revenue ratio
+ 1− (1− α)θi+1,ipi+1xi+1
pixi︸ ︷︷ ︸
cash/revenue ratio
(1.4)
Notice that the firm’s debt-to-revenue ratio is fixed, because firms collateralize their
end-of-period revenue for borrowing.
Crucially, equation (4) shows that χi is an equilibrium object - it is an endogenous
variable which depends on the firm’s forward credit linkage θi+1,i and the revenue of
its customer. Hence, changes in the price of its customer’s good affect the tightness
of firm i’s cash-in-advance. Note also that the dependence of χi on prices pi and pi+1
means that changes a shock will have general equilibrium effects on each χi. This a
key difference with Bigio and La’O (2015), in which the tightness of each firm’s cash-
in-advance is an exogenous parameter because there is no inter-firm lending. Here,
the endogeneity of χi will be a critical determinant of how the economy responds to
shocks.
Firm i chooses its input purchases to maximize its profits, subject to its cash-in-
advance.
max
ni, xi−1
pixi − wni − pi−1xi−1
s.t. wni + pixi−1 ≤ χipixi
Firms take the tightness χi of their constraints as given when choosing inputs.
2 The
solution of each firm’s given in detail in Appendix A3. Firm i’s optimality condition
equates the ratio of expenditure on each type of input with the ratio of their share of
2The firm’s decisions of how much to borrow and lend, i.e. bi, τi, and τi−1, are already embedded
in χi at this point. (See equation (4)). Therfore, given its choice of how much to borrow and lend,
the firm’s choice of ni and xi−1 is independent of χi.
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production.
wni
pi−1xi−1
=
ηi
ωi,i−1(1− ηi)
This condition pins down the ratio of expenditure on each input. However, the
constraint will limit the firm’s total expenditure on both inputs.
If firm i’s cash-in-advance is not binding in equilibrium, then it simply maximizes
its profit function. Its optimal level of expenditure on each input is determined by
a condition which equates the marginal cost of the input with its marginal revenue
product. The firm’s expenditure on labor is therefore given by
wni = ηipixi , pi−1 = ωi,i−1(1− ηi) pixi
xi−1
If, on the other hand, the constraint is binding in equilibrium, then the amount of
liquidity χipixi that firm i has limits how much the firm can spend on both inputs.
In particular, firm i’s expenditure on labor and good i− 1 is given by
wni = χiηipixi , pi−1 = χiωi,i−1(1− ηi) pixi
xi−1
I show in Appendix A3 that firm i’s cash-in-advance (3) binds in equilibrium if
and only if χi < 1. Combining the two cases (constrained and unconstrained) yields
w = φiηi
pixi
ni
, pi−1 = φiωi,i−1(1− ηi) pixi
xi−1
(1.5)
where φi ≡ min {1, χi} describes firm i’s shadow value of funds.3 φi is strictly less
than one if and only if firm i’s cash-in-advance is binding in equilibrium. Equations (5)
says that, if binding, the cash-in-advance inserts a wedge φi < 1 between the marginal
cost and marginal benefit of each input, representing the distortion in the firm’s input
3More precisely, the shadow value of funds of firm i is given by 1φi − 1.
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use created by the constraint. A tighter cash-in-advance (lower χi) corresponds to a
greater distortion, and lower output.
Through its dependence on the tightness χi of the firm’s constraint, φi is endoge-
nous to the model. The credit relationships between firms also imply that firms’
shadow value of funds φi are interdependent. To see this, first recall firm i + 1’s
optimality condition for its intermediate good (5),
pi = φi+1ωi+1,i(1− ηi+1)pi+1xi+1
xi
(1.6)
This says that the firm i + 1 chooses its level of intermediate good use xi to equate
the marginal cost of the good pi with the marginal revenue product, times times the
wedge φi+1 created by its cash-in-advance. Re-arranging this and replacing
pi+1xi+1
pixi
in (6) yields φi as an increasing function of φi+1.
φi = min
{
1, Bi + θi,i−1 − (1− α)θi+1,i 1
φi+1ωi+1,i(1− ηi+1)
}
The positive relationship between φi and φi+1 is a consequence of the fact that firms
collateralize their revenue to borrow from suppliers. A tighter constraint of firm i+ 1
implies that every firm upstream of i+ 1 also has a tighter constraint.
1.2.3 Equilibrium
I close the model by imposing labor and goods market clearing conditions:
N =
M∑
i=1
ni , C = Y ≡ xM
Definition of Equilibrium: An equilibrium is a set of prices {piiI , w }, quan-
tities xi, ni, τiiI that
i) maximize the representative household’s utility, subject to its budget constraint
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ii) maximize each firm’s profits subject to its cash-in-advance, bank borrowing, and
supplier borrowing constraints
iii) clear goods markets and the labor market.
Let ω˜i ≡
∏M
j=i+1 ωj,j−1 denote firm i’s share in total intermediate good use, and η˜i ≡
ηiω˜i denote firm i’s share of labor in aggregate output. Let Y¯ denote the equilibrium
aggregate output that would prevail in a frictionless economy ( la Acemoglu et al.
(2012)), given by
Y¯ ≡
M∏
i=1
η˜η˜ii z
ω˜i
i
Y¯ is log-linear in each firm’s productivity zi and depends on technology parameters ηi
and ωi,i−1 for all i. This is equivalent to an Acemoglu et al. (2012) economy in which
firms are organized in a vertical production network and face no financial constraints.
In Appendix A3, I show that for my economy, a closed-form expression for equi-
librium aggregate output Y is log-linear in the unconstrained aggregate output and
some aggregation of each firm’s shadow value of funds.
Y = Y¯ Φ¯ Φ¯ ≡
M∏
i=1
φ
∑i
j=1 η˜j
i (1.7)
The expression Φ¯ describes how the shadow values aggregate in the input-output
network. Thus, equilibrium aggregate output equals Y¯ if and only if φi = 1 for all i -
i.e. if no firm’s cash-in-advance is binding in equilibrium.4 Φ¯ captures the aggregate
liquidity available to all firms in the economy for trade in inputs. Therefore, (7)
4Note that although Y is log-linear in each φi, it is not globally log-linear in χi. (This is reflected
in the kink in φi at χi = ri.) Why is Y not globally log-linear in χi? The cash-in-advance creates a
kink in the policy function for employment ni at the point at which the cash-in-advance is no longer
binding, i.e. at χi = ri . This kink carries over to Y in aggregation. The kink implies: i) Y is not
differentiable with respect to φi at φi = 1; ii) the left derivative of Y with respect to χi is strictly
positive at χi = ri, and the right derivative is zero; iii) Y is not globally log-linear in χi.
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says that equilibrium aggregate output is constrained by the aggregate liquidity in
the economy at the beginning of the period. Notice that through η˜j, firms who
are further downstream have a higher share of total employment through the use of
intermediate goods, and therefore have a higher impact on aggregate liquidity.
To summarize the equilibrium, the cash-in-advance constraints faced by firms
induces a wedge on their production, which depends on the tightness of their con-
straints. But in a setting where firms share liqudiity via trade credit, these wedges
depend endogenously on the prices of downstream goods and the structure of the
credit network. In the next section, I explore the implications of this endogenous re-
lationship between wedges and prices for how aggregate output responds to firm-level
shocks.
At this stage, it is worth discussing how this economy compares to that of Bigio
and La’O (2015). The novelty of Bigio and La’O (2015) is to show how wedges aggre-
gate in an input-output network. However, in Bigio and La’O (2015), all payments
between firms are settled at the end of the period after production takes place. As
a result, there is no r5le for trade credit; and χi and φi are fixed exogenously. As
I show in the next section, the endogeneity of the wedges means that the economy
behaves qualitatively very differently in response to local shocks.
1.2.4 Aggregate Impact of Firm-Level Shocks
I now examine the response of aggregate output to firm-level liquidity and produc-
tivity shocks. I model a liquidity shock to firm i by a change in Bi, the fraction of
firm i’s revenue that the bank will accept as collateral for the bank loan. Consider a
marginal fall in Bi given by dBi. This is a reduced-form way to capture a reduction
in the supply of bank credit to firm i.5
5In the general network model in the following section, each firm sells some portion of its output
directly to the household. In this setting, one could alternatively interpret the fall in Bi as a failed
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The fall in Bi directly affects the amount of cash firm i can raise at the beginning
of the period, causing firm i’s cash-in-advance to tighten.
dχi
dBi
= 1 > 0
If firm i’s cash-in-advance is not binding in equilibrium (i.e. if χi < 1), then the
marginal drop in liquidity does not affect firm i’s its output.
d φi
dBi
=

1 > 0 if χi < 1
0 otherwise
On the other hand, if firm i’s constraint is binding in equilibrium, then the tighter
cash-in-advance forces the firm to cut back on production, as it no longer has suf-
ficient beginning-of-the-period funds to finance its original input purchases. This is
represented by an increase in firm i’s shadow value of funds, i.e. a decrease in φi.
Since the drop in firm i’s output is a contraction in the supply of good i, the price pi
of the good rises.
In the absence of any linkages with other firms, the effects of the shock would
be contained to firm i. However, the firm is linked to other firms via input-output
linkages ωcs and credit linkages θcs, which transmit the shock to other firms. Indeed,
the rise in the price pi of firm i’s good affects other firms in the economy in two ways.
Network Effects: Standard Input-Output Channel
The first channel, which I call the standard input-output channel, arises from the
input-output linkages between firm i and the other firms in the production network,
and is the standard channel analyzed in the input-output literature, including Ace-
payment by final consumer. In either case, these are idiosyncratic shocks to the firm’s liquidity, and
are not well-represented by a change in its productivity or technology.
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moglu et al. (2012) and Bigio and La’O (2015). This channel affects only firms
downstream of firm i. The reduction in firm i’s output increases the price pi of good
i. This acts as a supply shock to the customer downstream (firm i + 1), who is now
faced with a higher unit cost of its intermediate good. In response, firm i + 1 cuts
back on its use of both good i and labor.6 Its output falls, and the price of its owns
good pi+1, rises. This, in turn, acts as a supply shock to firm i+ 2, and so on. Thus,
as a result of the shock to firm i, all firms downstream experience a supply shock to
their intermediate goods, and cut back on labor as a result.
In this way, the initial liquidity shock to firm i is propagated downstream by the
input-output linkages between firms. The effect of the shock on aggregate output
is amplified because each time that a firm reduces its output, it cuts back on its
employment. The resulting fall in labor demand reduces the wage and therefore
reduces the household’s demand for the consumption good (and aggregate output).
Thus, by propagating the shock from firm to firm, the input-output linkages cause a
greater fall in aggregate demand for labor, thereby amplifying the initial effect of the
shock on aggregate output.
Note that this channel is ultimately driven by the input specificity in each firm’s
production technology, as each downstream firm is unable to offset the supply shock
by substituting away from using good i in their production, and each upstream firm
is unable to offset the demand shock by finding other customers for its good.
With Cobb-Douglas production, the price and quantity effects of the shock exactly
offset, leaving firm i’s demand for inputs unchanged. As a result, upstream firms are
unaffected by the input-output channel.7
6Firm i+ 1’s optimality condition for its use of intermediate good i implies that a higher pi will
cause the firm to reduce xi+1xi in response to the increase marginal cost of the good. This amounts to
reducing xi, its use of the intermediate good. The other optimality condition pins down the ratio of
expenditure on each input, implying that the fall in xi also causes the firm to reduce its employment
ni.
7See Acemoglu et al. (2015) for a detailed discussion.
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Network Effects: Credit Linkage Channel
In addition to the standard input-output channel, there is a new channel of prop-
agation - which I call the credit linkage channel - in which the shock disrupts the
flow of cash-in-advance payments upstream. This channel describes the endogenous
responses in the tightness χj of other firms’ cash-in-advance constraints. Recall that
when firm i cuts back on production, the price pi of its good rises. This rise in price
increases the collateral value of firm i’s revenue, which means that firm i can reduce
the cash-in-advance payment it makes to its supplier i − 1. Thus, with less cash
on-hand, the supplier i− 1 is now faced with a tighter cash-in-advance itself.
More precisely, there are three effects on χi−1, the tightness of i− 1’s constraint.
Recall the expression for χi−1.
χi−1 ≡ Bi−1 + θi−1,i−2 + 1− (1− α)θi,i−1 pixi
pi−1xi−1
(1.8)
First, the increase in pi reduces χi−1 due to the lower cash-in-advance payment re-
ceived from firm i, as discussed above. Second, the fall in firm i’s output increases the
ratio xi
xi−1
due to the decreasing returns to xi−1 (since (1 − ηi) < 1). And third, the
fall in i’s demand reduces the price pi−1 of good i− 1. Each of these effects reduces
the amount of cash that firm i − 1 has per unit of its revenue, and so the shock to
i unambiguously tightens firm i − 1’s cash-in-advance constraint. Notice from (8)
that these effects are increasing in i − 1’s downstream credit linkage θi,i−1. In this
manner, the credit linkages between i and i−1 transmit the liquidity shock upstream
by reducing the cash flow i makes to its supplier.
Thus, χi−1 unambiguously falls in reponse to the shock to i. Faced with a tighter
constraint, firm i − 1 may have to further cut back on its output, represented by a
rise in its wedge (i.e. a fall in φi−1). If it does indeed further cut back production,
than it also cuts back on employment. This reduces the demand for labor faced by
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the household, which in turn reduces the wage it earns. In this manner, the initial
effect of the shock is amplified. In addition, firm i − 1 in turn passes the shock on
to its own suppliers and customers via both channels. This is discussed in the next
section.
Note the role that α plays in mitigating the transmission of the shock via the
credit linkage channel. The higher that α is, i.e. the more that firm i − 1 can
collateralize its trade credit τi,i−1, the less that χi−1 falls in response to the shock to
i. Although i − 1 receives a smaller cash-in-advance payment from its customer, it
can collateralize a higher fraction of its trade credit to obtain more credit from the
bank. This reduces the loss in liqudity that it suffers due to the smaller cash payment.
Therefore, α parameterizes the degree to which each firm can substitute lost cash-
in-advance payments for a higher bank loan. The value of α does not effect the
qualitative results of the model, but may have a quantitative effect, which I explore
later on.
Interaction Between Channels
Importantly, the two channels of propagation interact to amplify the impact of the
initial shock to firm i, illustrated in the diagram below. The input-output (credit
linkage) channel is represented by blue (red) arrows. The effects begin with line (1),
when the intial liquidity shock to firm i triggers supply effects to other firms in the
network via the standard input-output channel. The initial impact of the shock is
amplified by the input-output linkages between firms. In the absence of the credit
linkage channel, the aggregate effect of the shock would be limited to this top line.
However, each firm’s constraint reacts endogenously to the initial shock through
changes in cash-in-advance payments, implying that the aggregate impact of the shock
is actually much larger. Indeed, the fall in φi causes firm i − 1 to receive less cash-
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in-advance, pushing down φi−1. This is equivalent to a second liquidity shock to firm
i− 1, causing it to further reduce production. This extra drop in firm i− 1’s output
again propagates to other firms in the network via input-output linkages, causing a
larger drop in aggregate output, represented by line (2). In turn, firm i− 1’s reduced
cash payment to its supplier yields yet more supply effects, and so on, causing the
initial effect of the shock to be amplified as it is transmitted upstream.
In this manner, the credit linkages between firms trigger the standard input-output
channel at every level of production, increasing the total downstream supply effects
faced by each firm. Thus, a firm-level liquidity shock to in my model is isomorphic to
an aggregate liquidity shock to all firms in a model with fixed constraints, e.g. Bigio
and La’O (2015). I explore this point in further detail in the quantitative analysis.
Impact of Firm-Level Shock on Aggregate Output
I now formalize the network effects of the shock on aggregate output. Recall from (7)
that equilibrium aggregate output is log-linear in each firm’s wedge
log Y = log Y¯ + log Φ¯
Then the elasticity of aggregate output with respect to firm i’s bank borrowing Bi is
given by
d log Y
dBi
=
d log Φ¯
dBi
Y¯ depends only on technology parameters and the productivity of each firm. The
liquidity shock to i therefore affects aggregate output only via Φ¯, which represents the
aggregate liquidity available to all firms. Indeed, if no firm’s cash-in-advance binds
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in equilibrium, then a marginal change in any firm’s liquidity has no impact on any
firm’s output.
In Appendix A5, I show that the effect of Bi on aggregate liquidity can be decom-
posed as follows
d log Φ¯
dBi
=
M∑
j=1
v¯j
d log φj
dBi
(1.9)
The terms
d log φj
dBi
capture how the liquidity shock to firm i affects the shadow value of
funds of every other firm j in the network via the credit linkage channel of propagation.
The terms v¯j map these changes in each firm’s constraint into aggregate output, and
capture the standard input-output channel. v¯j depends on the share of labor in
aggregate output of each firm.
v¯j =
j∑
k=1
η˜k
The decompostion given by (9) will allow me to quantify the aggregate effects of each
channel later on.
Proposition 1 and its corollary, below, constitute the main theoretical result of
the paper: firm-level shocks are amplified by the credit network of the economy.
Intuitively, stronger credit linkages imply that in response to increases in collateral
value, suppliers increase their lending by more, and therefore receive less cash-in-
advance; as a result, aggregate liquidity dries up faster in response to shocks. Firms
have to cut back on employment and production by more, amplifying the impact of
the shock on aggregate output. Notice also that the aggregate impact of a firm-level
shock depends on its location in network: shocks to different firms will propagate
differently depending on the input-output and credit linkages between firms. Indeed,
how central the shocked firm is in both the production and credit networks of the
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economy will ultimately determine a shock’s aggregate impact.
Proposition 1:
d log φj
dBi
≥ 0 and is weakly increasing in θij for all firms i
and j.
Proof: See Appendix A5.
Proposition 1 states that a drop in firm i’s liquidity Bi causes other firms j to
experience an adverse liquidity shock as well, and that the size of this effect is increas-
ing in the downstream credit linkages between firms, as I discussed in the description
of the credit linkage channel. A corollary of this proposition shows how this in turn
affects aggregate output.
Corollary: d log Y
dBi
≥ 0 and is weakly increasing in θjk for all firms i, j,
and k.
Proof: This follows from Proposition 1 and (7)
In the absence of the credit linkage channel, i.e. if the wedges φj were fixed as in
Bigio and La’O (2015), we would have
d log φj
dBi
= 0 for all j 6= i, and (9) would reduce
to v¯i. However, since
d log φj
dBi
≥ 0 for all j, the endogenous response of the wedges
amplifies the aggregate impact of the shock. In addition, the size of this amplification
depends on the structure of credit linkages between the firms, θij.
Now consider a productivity shock to firm i, represented by a fall in i’s total
factor productivity (TFP) zi. What is the effect on aggregate output? Recall the
closed-form expression (7) for aggregate output
Y = Y¯ Φ¯
where
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Y¯ ≡
M∏
j=1
η˜
η˜j
j z
ω˜j
j Φ¯ ≡
M∏
j=1
φ
∑j
k=1 η˜k
j
As it turns out, the aggregation of firm wedges Φ¯ is independent of zi. To see this,
first recall that φM = min{1, χM}, where χM = θM,M−1 + BM . Firm M’s shadow
value of funds is thus independent of all zi. Next, recall that φM−1 = min{1, χM−1},
where
χM−1 = θM,M−1 +BM + 1− (1− α) θM
φMωM,M−1(1− ηM)
Thus, φM−1 is also independent of all zi. Continuing recursively, it follows that all
wedges φj are independent of TFP zi. Intuitively, changes in a firm’s TFP do not
affect the severity of agency frictions between the firm and its creditors, and therefore
they do not affect the tightness of its cash-in-advance.
Since zi enters only in Y¯ , we have
d log Y
d zi
=
ω˜i
zi
Recall that ω˜i ≡
∏M
j=i+1 ωj,j−1 represents firm i’s share in total intermediate good
use. A fall in firm i’s productivity affects its demand for intermediate goods and
its supply of good i. This is the standard input-output channel at work. However,
productivity shocks don’t affect firms’ cash-in-advance constraints φj. Therefore, the
credit network plays no role in propagating productivity shocks.
Because liquidity shocks directly affect firm wedges while productivity shocks do
not, productivity and liquidity shocks will have differential effects on a firm’s output
and employment. In the empirical part of the paper, I will use these differential effects
to separately identify liquidity and productivity shocks from the data.
To summarize, three main insights emerge from the model. First, when firms are
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suppliers of intermediate goods as well as the creditors who finance the transactions
of these goods, firm-level shocks can endogenously generate large changes in the
aggregate liquidity available for trade in intermediate goods. This creates a multiplier
effect which amplifies the aggregate effects of firm-level shocks. Second, the aggregate
impact of these shocks depends on structure of the credit network, i.e. how firms
borrow from and lend to one another.
But what precisely is the role of the credit network? Until now, the structure of
the networks was assumed to be a straight line, shedding little light on its exact role in
generating aggregate fluctuations. And is this mechanism quantitatively relevant? To
answer these questions requires a model incorporating more features of the economy
which can be taken to the data. To this end, I return to the general network framework
in the next section.
Chapter 2
Financial Shocks in a Credit Network
Economy
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I build on the insights from Chapter I and show that inter-firm
lending plays an important role in business cycle fluctuations. To this end, I introduce
supplier credit into a network model of the economy and quantitatively show that the
credit network of an economy amplifies the effects of financial shocks. I then use
my framework to empirically shed light on the origins of observed business cycle
fluctuations in the US.
My approach involves three steps. First, I embed the mechanism in Chapter
I into a more general macroeconomic framework, similar to that of Acemoglu et
al. (2012) and Bigio and La’O (2015). Second, I calibrate the model to assess
the quantitative importance of the propagation mechanism. For this, I construct
a proxy of the credit linkages between US industries by combining firm-level balance
sheet data and industry-level input-output data. I find that the credit network of
the US economy accounts for 22 percent of the fall in GDP following an aggregate
financial shock. Finally, I investigate which shocks drive the US business cycle when
we account for the credit linkages between industries. To do so, I use a structural
factor approach to estimate the contribution of productivity and financial shocks to
observed aggregate fluctuations in US industrial production (IP) from 1997-2013, and
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find that these fluctuations were driven primarily by aggregate financial shocks and
idiosyncratic productivity shocks. During the Great Recession, productivity shocks
played a minimal role; rather, most of the drop in aggregate IP was driven by an
aggregate financial shock.
Next, I evaluate the quantitative relevance of the mechanism. I first generalize
the model to capture more features of the economy. In order to calibrate the model,
I then construct a proxy of inter-industry trade credit flows by combining firm-level
balance sheet data from Compustat with industry-level input-output data from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis. With this, I produce a map of the credit network
of the US economy at the three-digit NAICS level of detail. I calibrate the model
to match this proxy and the input-output matrices of the US. I also allow for sub-
stitutability between cash-in-advance payments and bank credit, so that firms can
partially offset a loss in customer payments with increased bank borrowing. I set this
parameter to match firm-level evidence from Omiccioli (2005) on how much Italian
firms collateralize their trade credit for bank borrowing.
In response to a one percent financial shock to every industry in the US, I find that
GDP falls by 2.9 percent. The credit linkage channel accounts for nearly a quarter
of this drop, reflecting the quantitative importance of the propagation mechanism.
Compared to a model without inter-firm lending, the credit network of the economy
amplifies the fall in GDP by 28 percent. I then explore which features of the US
economy contribute to this amplification. In particular, I find that industries which
are important suppliers of intermediate goods to the rest of the economy are also
more vulnerable to nonpayment by their customers - a feature which exacerbates the
impact of financial shocks.
Having shown that the credit network of the economy can generate quantitatively
significant aggregate fluctuations, I then ask whether it does in the data. In the
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empirical part of the paper, I evaluate how much of observed fluctuations in output
can be attributed to the credit network of the economy. I also investigate which
shocks drive the US business cycle when we account for the effects of credit linkages
in propagating financial shocks across industries.
To this end, I use quarterly output and employment data on US industrial pro-
duction industries over 1997-2013, from the Federal Reserve Board’s Industrial Pro-
duction Indexes and the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Quarterly Census of Employment
and Wages, respectively. With this data, I use a structural factor approach similar to
that of Foerster et al. (2011) to estimate shocks which hit these industries over my
sample period. This approach involves two stages.
In the first stage, I use a log-linear approximation of the model to back-out the
productivity and financial shocks to each industry required for the model to match
the fluctuations in the output and employment data. The model is able to separately
identify these shocks because each type of shock has differential effects on industry
output and employment. Namely, productivity shocks affect the ratio of output
to employment through Cobb-Douglas production functions. On the other hand,
financial shocks do not affect production functions. Rather, they work through cash-
in-advance constraints and thereby affect industries’ first-order conditions. In the
second stage, I use standard factor methods to decompose each of these quarterly
productivity and financial shocks into an aggregate component and an idiosyncratic
component. In all, I thus estimate four types of shocks: aggregate and idiosyncratic
productivity shocks, and aggregate and idiosyncratic financial shocks.
To gauge the external validity of the structural factor analysis, I compare the ag-
gregate financial shocks estimated using the model with a measure of the risk-bearing
capacity of the US financial sector - namely, the excess bond premium of Gilchrist and
Zakrajsek (2012). There turns out to be a fairly strong negative correlation between
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the two time series (approximately negative one-half), suggesting that the aggregate
financial shocks picked up by the model are indeed reflective of changes in the supply
of credit from the financial sector to the IP industries.
With the estimated liquidity and productivity shocks at hand, I perform a variance
decomposition of aggregate IP to estimate how much of aggregate volatility was driven
by each of these shocks. I find that, before the Great Recession, aggregate fluctuations
were driven primarily by idiosyncratic productivity shocks and aggregate financial
shocks. Moreover, the credit network of US IP played a quantitatively important
role in propagating these financial shocks, generating at least 17 percent of observed
aggregate volatility over this period.
During the Great Recession, however, productivity shocks seemed to have played
little role. Rather, three-quarters of the peak-to-trough drop in aggregate IP can
be attributed to an aggregate financial shock to these industries. In addition, I show
that idiosyncratic financial shocks to the three most systemically important IP indus-
tries - oil and coal manufacturing, chemical manufacturing, and auto manufacturing
- accounts for between 9 and 27 percent of the drop in aggregate IP during the reces-
sion. Furthermore, the credit and input-output linkages between industries played a
significant role in propagating these industry-level shocks across the economy.
Much of the previous literature has relied on aggregate productivity shocks to
drive the business cycle. Yet by many accounts, this has been an unsatisfactory
explanation due to the lack of direct evidence for such shocks. This paper, however,
finds a minimal role for aggregate productivity shocks in the US business cycle, but
a vital one for aggregate financial shocks. Hence, my results suggest that when
one accounts for the effects of credit linkages between industries, aggregate financial
shocks seem to displace aggregate productivity shocks as a prominent driver of the US
business cycle. This finding is in line both with growing evidence on the importance of
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the financial sector for real activity, and with standard interpretations of the causes of
the Great Recession. Thus, by explicitly accounting for the propagation generated by
credit linkages, this paper captures the importance of financial shocks for aggregate
fluctuations in the real economy.
2.2 Generalized Model
I now generalize the mode of the previous chapter to capture more features of the
economy. Specifically, I generalize the network structure of the economy and the
household preferences. I assume that each of the M goods can be consumed by the
representative household or used in the production of other goods. The household’s
total consumption C is Cobb-Douglas over the M goods
C ≡
M∏
i=1
cβii
The household has Greenwood-Hercowitz-Huffman (GHH) preferences given by
U(C, N) =
1
1− γ
(
C − 1
1 + 
N1+
)1−γ
where  and γ respectively denote the Frisch and income elasticity of labor supply.
Quantitatively similar results will hold for preferences which are additively separable
in aggregate consumption C and labor N . The household maximizes its utility subject
to (1), the household budget constraint. This yields optimality conditions equating
the ratio of expenditure on each good with the ratio of their marginal utilities, and
equating the competitive wage with the marginal rate of substitution between aggre-
gate consumption and labor.
pici
pjcj
=
βi
βj
, N1+ = C
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Each firm can trade with all other firms. Firm i’s production function is again
Cobb-Douglas over labor and intermediate goods.
xi = z
ηi
i n
ηi
i
(
m∏
j=1
x
ωij
ij
)1−ηi
Here, xi denotes firm i’s output and xij denotes firm i’s use of good j. Since ωij
denotes the share of j in i’s total intermediate good use, I assume
∑M
j=1 ωij = 1,
implying that each firm has constant returns to scale. The input-output structure of
economy can summarized by the matrix Ω of intermediate good shares ωij.
1
Ω ≡

ω11 ω12 ω13 · · · ω1M
ω21 ω22 ω23
ω31 ω32 ω33
...
. . .
ωM1 ωMM

This matrix describes the structure of the production network. Note that the produc-
tion network is defined only by technology parameters. As we will see, the presence
of financial frictions will distort inter-firm trade in equilibrium. Hence, Ω describes
how firms would trade with each other in the absence of frictions.
Each firm’s cash-in-advance takes the same form as in the stylized model, with
the exception that each firm has M suppliers and M customers instead of just one of
each. Firm i is required to pay its wage bill wni and its intermediate good purchases
psxis from each supplier s in advance. It receives a loan bi from the bank and a trade
credit loan τis from each supplier.
wni +
M∑
s=1
(psxis − τis)︸ ︷︷ ︸
net CIA payment to suppliers
≤ bi + pixi −
M∑
c=1
τci︸ ︷︷ ︸
net CIA received from customers
1This is simply a generalization of the input-output structure in the stylized model. In that case,
the Ω would be given by a matrix of zeros, with one sub-diagonal of ones, reflecting the vertical
production structure and the constant returns to scale technology of firms.
31
Each firm faces a borrowing constraint each of its suppliers, to which it can pledge
fractions θis of its revenue in return for the loans. The borrowing constraints take the
form
τis ≤ θispixi
The structure of the credit network between firms can be summarized by the matrix
of θij’s.
Θ =

θ11 θ12 θ13 · · · θ1M
θ21 θ22 θ23
θ31 θ32 θ33
...
. . .
θM1 θMM

Henceforth, I refer to this matrix as the credit network of the economy. As we will see,
the structure of this network will play an important role in determing the aggregate
impact of idiosyncratic shocks.
Each firm can also borrow bi from the bank by pledging Bi of its revenue and
1− α of its accounts receivable ∑Mc=1 τci, so that its bank borrowing constraint takes
the form
bi ≤ Bipixi + α
M∑
c=1
τci
α < 1 parameterizes the substitutability of cash-in-advance payments and bank
credit. If i’s customer c reduces its cash-in-advance payment to i by one dollar,
then i experiences a net loss in liquidity of 1 − α dollars; it looses 1 dollar in cash,
but is able to borrow α more dollars from the bank. Thus, it is able to partially
substitute the lost cash payment with more bank credit. α = 0 corresponds to the
case when the two are not substitutable, and α = 1 to the case when they are fully
substitutable. The choice of α will have an effect of the quantitative predictions of
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the model, which I discuss later on.
Each firm chooses the size of the loan to obtain from each creditor, so that the bor-
rowing constraints bind in equilibrium. Plugging the binding borrowing constraints
into firm i’s cash-in-advance yields a constraint on i’s total input purchases
wni +
M∑
s=1
psxis ≤ χipixi
where χi denotes the tightness of i’s cash-in-advance.
χi = Bi +
M∑
s=1
θis + 1− (1− α)
M∑
c=1
θci
pcxc
pixi
Note that χi is again an equilibrium object, depending on the prices customers’ goods
pc and forward credit linkages θci for all c.
Firms choose labor and intermediate goods to maximize profits subject to their
cash-in-advance. This yields optimality conditions of the same form, equating the
ratio of expenditure on each good with the ratio of their marginal revenue products.
wni
pjxij
=
ηi
(1− ηi)ωij
Again, the cash-in-advance of firm i inserts a wedge φi between the marginal cost and
marginal revenue product of each input
ni = φiηi
pi
w
xi xij = φi (1− ηi)ωij pi
pj
xi (2.1)
where the wedge is determined by the firm’s shadow value of funds.
φi = min {1 , χi} (2.2)
Note that the wedge is still an equilibrium object, depending on collateral value
of each customer’s output and forward credit linkages. Endogenous wedges imply
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equilbrium will take same form, and will respond in qualitatively the same way as
previously.
Market clearing conditions for labor and each intermediate good are given by
N =
M∑
i=1
ni xi = ci +
M∑
c=1
xci
The richness of the model afforded by the general network structure and household
preferences will allow me to take the model to the data and examine quantitatively
the role of the credit network in generating aggregate fluctuations. The equilibrium
conditions take the same form as in the stylized model, and the economy will behave
in qualitatively the same way in response to shocks as in the stylized model. However,
the general network structure precludes a closed-form solution.
2.2.1 Relationship Between Firm Influence and Size
A well-known critique of standard input-output models such as Acemoglu et al. (2012)
is that a sufficient statistic for a firm’s influence is its share of total sales in the
economy. In other words, the size of a firm as measured by its share of aggregate
sales is sufficient to determine the aggregate impact of a shock to sector i, and one
does not need to know anything about the underlying input-output structure of the
economy. All relevant information is captured by the sales share. As a result, an
idiosyncratic shock to any firm is isomporphic to an aggregate TFP shock weighted
by each firm’s share of total value-added. This feature makes it difficult to claim that
the origin of aggregate fluctuations is idiosyncratic rather than aggregate shocks,
using this class of frictionless models.
Bigio and La’O (2015), however, show that this isomorphism breaks down when
the economy has frictions. In particular, the impact on economic aggregates of an
idiosyncratic shock to sector i depends on the underlying input-output structure of
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the economy, and cannot be summarized by the sector’s share of aggregate sales.
My model shows that when the constraints faced by firms depends endogenously
on their credit relationships and the prices of downstream goods, knowing the input-
output structure of the economy is no longer sufficient to measure the aggregate
impact of a shock to a sector or firm i. How a liquidity shock propagates to other
firms depends on the credit linkages between them. Therefore, to know how shocks
propagate in my economy, one needs to know the underlying structure of credit link-
ages between firms. Thus, the aggregate impact of an idiosyncratic shock depends on
the structure of the input-output network, and the structure of the credit network.
2.2.2 Solving the General Model
The equilibrium of the general model is the solution to system of M2 + 5M + 2
nonlinear equations in the same number of unknowns, listed in Appendix A6. For
any set of model parameters
{{
zi, Bi, ηi, βi, {θij, ωij}jI
}
iI
, α, , γ
}
there is a unique solution to the system. Since the model is one period, the behavior
of the system in response to shocks can be modeled by comparative statics. In partic-
ular, I am interested in the change in the economy that results form a perturbation of
one or more of the model parameters {Bi, zi}iI , representing liquidity and produc-
tivity shocks, respectively. I therefore log-linearize the system of nonlinear equations
around a point {B∗i , z∗i }. In the quantitative analysis, I calibrate this point (and the
remainder of the parameters), to match data for the US economy. I thus obtain a
log-linear approximation for the response of the equilibrium variables to firm-level
liquidity and productivity shocks.
It is worth clarifying one point about productivity shocks. It turns out from
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the Cobb-Douglas specification of firm production functions that the equilibrium is
already log-linear in each zi. Therefore, the log-linearized response of the equilibrium
variables to a change in zi is independent of the level of zi. Therefore, I do not need
to calibrate the parameters {zi}iI to approximate a response in the economy to a
productivity shock. Indeed, when one log-linearizes the equilibrium system around
{B∗i , z∗i }, z∗i drops out of the log-linear equations.
2.3 Quantitative Analysis
Having established analytically that the credit network of the economy can amplify
firm-level shocks, I now ask whether this mechanism is quantitatively significant for
the US, and examine more carefully the role that the structure of the credit network
plays. But before these questions can be addressed, I need disaggregated data on
trade credit flows in order to calibrate the credit network of the US economy.
Unfortunately, data on trade credit flows at any level of detail is scarce. While
accounts payable and receivable are generally observable at the firm-level from Com-
pustat, flows of trade credit between firm- or industry-pairs is not. In order to over-
come this paucity of data, I construct a proxy of industry-level trade credit flows
from industry-level input-output data and firm-level balance sheet data, which I now
describe.
2.3.1 Mapping the US Credit Network
The purpose of this section is to construct a proxy for trade credit flows τij between
industries i and j, from which I can later calibrate the structural parameters θij. To
build my proxy, I use two sources of data: input-output tables from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA) and Compustat North America over the sample period
1997-2013. The BEA publishes annual data on commodity use by industry (Uses by
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Commodity Table) at the three-digit level of the North American Industry Classifi-
cation System (NAICS). At this level, there are 58 industries, exlcuding the financial
sector. From this data, I observe annual trade flows between each industry-pair,
which corresponds to pjxij in my model for every industry pair {i, j}. The BEA also
publishes an annual Direct Requirements tables at the same level of detail, which
indicate for each industry the amount of a commodity that is required to produce
one dollar of that industry’s output. These values are quite stable over my sample
period. In constructing my proxy, and also in calibrating the model later, I use the
input-output tables of the median year in my sample, 2005.
Compustat collects balance-sheet information annually from all publicly-listed
firms in the US. The available data includes each firm’s total accounts payable, ac-
counts receivable, cost of goods sold, and sales in each year of the sample. Therefore,
while I cannot identify from whom each firm receives trade credit or to whom it ex-
tends credit, I observe the total stock of trade credit and trade debt that it has in
any year.
To construct the proxy of trade credit flows, I partly follow the strategy of Raddatz
(2010). I begin with the observation that a trade credit loan from supplier to customer
is typically a fraction of the value of the sale from supplier to customer.2 I therefore
assume that the trade credit from industry j to industry i is proportional to the value
of the sale.
τij = qijpjxij
Here, qij denotes the fraction of i’s purchase from j made on trade credit. The value
of the total purchase pjxij is directly observable from the BEA input-output tables.
2 This has been documented empirically in various studies including Petersen and Rajan (1997).
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So to construct the proxy for τij, it remains to construct an estimate of qij for each
industry-pair.
Appendix A14 describes this procedure in detail. The idea is as follows. Using
data on firms’ accounts payable and accounts revenue from Compustat, I first con-
struct measures of each industy’s payables financing and receivables lending. These
respectively descibe, on average, how intensively firms in the industry borrow from
their suppliers and lend to their customers. Then to proxy qij, i.e. how much of
j’s sales to i are made on credit, I take a weighted average of industry i’s payables
financing and industry j’s receivables lending. My weighting scheme minimizes the
mean squared errors in the observed accounts payables of each industry.
Given my proxy qˆij, inter-industry trade credit flows are then proxied as
τˆij = qˆijpjxij
As such, I have a map of the credit network of the US economy at the three-digit
NAICS level of detail, with which I can quantitatively evaluate the model.3
2.4 Calibration
With proxy for trade credit flows at hand, I calibrate the general model of Section 6
to match data on the US economy. My calibration strategy involves using the BEA
input-output tables to calibrate technology parameters, and my proxy to calibrate
the financial parameters. In this section, I describe this strategy in detail.
3 I omit the financial sector from my analysis.
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2.4.1 Technology Parameters
I calibrate technology parameters ηi and ωij to match the BEA input-output tables
of the median year in my sample, 2005. At the three-digit level, I have 58 industries
after exlcuding financial industries. From firm i’s optimality conditions (10), we can
write the firm’s total expenditure on inputs as
wni +
M∑
j=1
pjxij =
(
ηi + [1− ηi]
M∑
j=1
ωij
)
φipixi
= φipixi
where the second equality holds due to the constant returns to scale of i’s production
technology. This implies that
φi =
wni +
∑M
j=1 pjxij
pixi
(2.3)
The right-hand side of (12) is directly observable from the BEA’s Direct Require-
ments table. Therefore I calibrate φi to match industry i’s direct requirements of all
commodities and labor.
Looking through the lense of the model, the observed input-output tables reflect
both technology parameters and distortions created by the liquidity onstraints. My
calibration strategy respects this feature. In particular, I calibrate technology param-
eters using firm i’s optimality conditions for each input and my calibrated φi’s
ηi =
wni
φipixi
ωij =
pjxij
(1− ηi)φipixi
Again the ratios wni
pixi
and
pjxij
pixi
are directly observable from the Direct Requirements
tables for every industry i and j.
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2.4.2 Financial Parameters
I calibrate the parameters θij, representing severity of agency problems between in-
dustry j and i, to match my proxy of inter-industry trade credit flows τˆij. Industry
i’s binding borrowing constraints pin down its level of borrowing from each of its
suppliers j.
θij =
τij
pixi
Industry i’s total revenue pixi is directly observable from the Uses by Commodity
tables. (Recall that I use the input-output tables for year 2005). I then use this and
my proxy for trade credit τˆij to calibrate θij.
To calibrate Bi, the parameters reflecting the severity of agency problems between
each industry and the bank, recall the definition of φi given by (11), which depends
on the technology parameters (calibrated as described above) and the tightness χi of
each industry’s cash-in-advance, where
χi = Bi +
M∑
s=1
θis + 1− (1− α)
M∑
c=1
θci
pcxc
pixi
(2.4)
The total revenue of each industry pixi is observable from the Uses by Commodity
tables, and φi and θis for all s were calibrated as described above. I therefore use (13)
and (11) to back out Bi for each industry.
Appendix A12 plots the calibrated matrix Θ, which represents the credit network
of the US economy at the three-digit NAICS level of detail. The matrix is relatively
sparse in areas in which indistries do not engage in much trade. Also firms within
the same industry are lend to and borrow from one another more intensively, as
represented by the red diagonal.
To identify which industries take a more central role in the credit network, I define
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the credit out-degree (CODi) and credit in-degree (CIDi) of industry i as
CODi ≡
M∑
c=1
qci CIDi =
M∑
s=1
qis
These two measures respectively measure how much trade credit an industry provides
the rest of the economy, and how much it receives from the rest of the economy.. An
industry with a high credit out-degree (credit in-degree) makes a high fraction of its
total sales (intermediate goods purchases) on credit, ceteris paribus. A few industries
take particularly central positions in the credit network of the US: the technical
services and oil and gas extraction industries provide the rest of the economy with
a lot of credit, while the oil and gas auto manufacturing absorb a large amount of
credit from the rest of the economy. Figure 2 plots the distribution of the credit out-
and in-degrees of the US.
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Figure 2·1: Distribution of trade credit use by industry: (a) trade
credit lending; and (b) trade credit borrowing.
While there is significantly more variation in the credit in-degrees of industries
(standard deviation 2.24) than the credit out-degrees (standard deviation 1.48), the
distribution of the former is skewed right.
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2.4.3 Remaining Parameters
It remains to calibrate the Frisch and income elasticity parameters  and γ, and
α which parameterizes the substitutability of cash-in-advance payments and bank
credit. I follow the standard literature and set  = 1 and γ = 2. Omiccioli (2005)
examines how firms collateralize their trade credit for bank borrowing for a sample
of Italian firms, and finds that the median firm in the sample collateralizes about 20
percent of its accounts receivable. I therefore set α = 0.2.
2.5 Quantitative Results
With my model calibrated to match the US economy, I am in a position to examine the
quantitative response of the economy to industry-level and aggregate productivity and
liquidity shocks. I first ask how much aggregate fluctuations does the credit network
of the US economy generate?
2.5.1 Aggregate Liquidity Shock
In order to answer this, I perform the following exercise. Suppose that the economy
is hit with a one percent aggregate liquidity shock: each industry i’s liquidity falls by
one percent. By how much does aggregate output Y fall?
To the guage the maximium effect that the credit network can generate, I first
compute the fall in Y for α = 0. This corresponds to the case in which industries
cannot substitute lost cash-in-advance payments for more bank credit. The propaga-
tion of liquidity shocks is strongest for this case. I then allow for subsitutability by
setting α to its baseline calibrated value of 0.2, in order to have a more conservative
estimate of the aggregate impact of the shock.
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Table 2.1: Aggregate response for α = 0
Total With credit linkage channel
Shut-Off
Pct. Fall in Y 3.70 2.54
Results for α = 0
I find that, under this specification, aggregate output falls by 3.7 percent. This is
represents a large aggregate effect of the shock. To assess how much of this drop in
aggregate output is generated by the propagation of shocks via the credit network,
I perform the same exercise, shutting down the credit linkage channel. I leave the
detailed technical explanation of how I do this to Appendix A8. The intuitive ex-
planation is as follows. Recall that in the model, changes to firm i’s wedge φi come
either from the direct liquidity shock B˜i to firm i, or from shocks to other firms being
transmitted to i via its credit linkages. In shutting down the credit linkage channel, I
impose that changes in the wedges come only from direct liquidity shocks to each firm.
In this way, the credit linkages play no role in propagating shocks. With the credit
linkage channel shut down, I compute the response in aggregate output to the same
aggregate shock, and compare it to the baseline case. The results are summarized in
Table 1.
The effect of the credit linkages in propagating the shocks throughout the network
increase the response in aggregate output to the shock by 1.38 percentage points.
Put differently, the credit network accounts for 31.4 percent of the fluctuation in
aggregate output in response to an aggregate liquidity shock. These are quantitatively
significant results, suggesting that the credit network of the US can play an important
role in generating aggregate fluctuations in GDP from liquidity shocks.
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Table 2.2: Aggregate response for α = 0.2
Total With credit linkage channel
Shut-Off
Pct. Fall in Y 2.92 2.28
Results for for α = 0.2
Next, I perform the same exercise for with α = 0.2, allowing for substitutability
between bank credit and cash-in-advance payments. Table 2 reports the results.
Even in this more conservative case, the aggregate impact of the shock is quite
large: Y falls by 3.15 percent. Although the amplification generated by the credit net-
work falls substantially, it is still quantitatively relevant. The credit linkages between
industries produce a larger drop in Y by 0.64 percentage points. Put differently, the
credit network of the US accounts for 22 percent of the drop in GDP in response to
the aggregate liquidity shock. Therefore, even allowing for firms to substitute lost
payments with increased bank borrowing does not substantially diminish the effect
of credit linkages in generating aggregate fluctuations. The remainder of the paper
uses α = 0.2.
Which industries are most vulnerable to the aggregate liquidity shock? Put dif-
ferently, which experience the largest drop in output?
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Figure 2·2: Most vulnerable industries.
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Figure 3 plots the five most vulnerable and five least vulnerable industries. The
figure indicates that there is a large degree of heterogeneity in the response of indus-
tries to the aggregate liquidity shock. While the output of the construction industry
falls by less than 1 percent, that of oil and gas mining falls by over 16 percent.
2.5.2 Industry-Level Liquidity Shocks
Next, I ask which industries are most systemically important in the economy, and how
this relates to their position in the credit network. I measure the systemic importance
of industry i by the elasticity of aggregate output with respect to its liquidity Bi.
4 A
higher elasticity implies that an industry-level liquidity shock to i has a larger impact
on aggregate output.
Figure 4 shows a bar graph of the ten most systemically important industries in
the US. The blue bars show the elasiticity of aggregate output with respect to each
industry’s liquidity, or the percentage drop in Y following a 1 percent drop in Bi.
The red bars show the contribution of the full credit network to each elasticity,
which is computed by subtracting the drop in Y that occurs with credit linkage
channel shut off, from the total drop in Y . To shut off the credit linkage channel, I
impose that each industry’s wedge φi changes only in response to a direct liquidity
shock to that industry, and not endogenously through credit linkages with other
industries. This gives the drop in aggregate output that would occur in the absence
of credit linkages, i.e. if the wedges of industries did not respond endogenously to
changes in prices. This is explained in more detail in Appendix A9. In this way, I
numerically measure by how much the industry-level shock is amplified by the credit
network.
Two results emerge from this exercise. First, the model implies that an industry-
4Recall that in the general model precludes analytical expressions for this elasticity. I therefore
compute these numerically.
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Figure 2·3: Most systemically important industries.
level liquidity shock can have a strong impact on US GDP. For example, although
the technical services industry accounts for only .069 percent of US GDP, a one
percent liquidity shock this industry causes a fall in GDP of .19 percent, due to its
input-output and credit linkages with other industries. This is an enormous response
in aggregate output. In the absence of any linkages, the elasticity of GDP to this
industry’s liquidity would be equal to its share of GDP; i.e. GDP would fall by only
.069 percent in response to this shock. Therefore, the network effects generated by
input-output and credit linkages greatly amplify the aggregate impact of the industry-
level shock.
Second, the credit network of the US plays a quantitatively significant role in
amplifying these industry-level shocks. On average, between one fifth to one half of
the fall in GDP in response to an industry-level shock is due to the role of credit
linkages in propagating the shock across the network. Consider again a one percent
liquidity shock to the technical services industry. In the absence of credit linkages,
US GDP would fall by only .16 percent in response this shock. Therefore, the credit
network accounts for about one fifth of this industry’s systemic importance. (The
remainder of the amplification is then caused, of course, by the input-output linkages).
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2.5.3 What Features of the US Economy Contribute to Amplification?
What features of the US economy contribute to the amplification of liquidity shocks?
As it turns out, in the US, industries which are important suppliers of intermediate
goods (e.g. manufacturing industries) happen to also be important providers of credit
to the rest of the economy. This means that these industries are more vulnerable to
nonpayment by customers. As a result of this property, liquidity shocks to industries
downstream will have a larger aggregate impact.
To see this, recall the definition of an industry’s credit out-degree (COD), re-
produced below, which summarizes how much credit the industry provides the rest
of the economy. Industries with a higher credit out-degree are more vulnerable to
nonpayment by their customers: they are more constrained ceteris paribus, and have
extended more credit to their customers. Now define an industry’s production out-
degree (POD) as
CODi ≡
M∑
c=1
qci PODi ≡
M∑
c=1
ωci
The production out-degree of an industry summarizes how important it is as a supplier
of intermediate goods to the rest of the economy. A higher production out-degree
means that the goods produced by this industry are widely used by other industries.
Figure 5 shows a scatter plot of industries’ credit and production out-degrees, with
a fitted least-squares line. There is a fairly strong positive correlation between the
two measures (correlation 0.35), indicating that industries which take a more central
position in the economy’s input-output network also take a more central position in
the credit network, on average.5
5While my paper is agnostic about the source of this correlation, one could conjecture explana-
tions for a positive correlation. For example industries which produce more ’basic’ goods, such as
mining or manufacturing industries, may have some advantage over others to enforce debt repay-
ment due to the nature of the goods. Although the question of why important suppliers provide
more credit is an important and interesting one, it is beyond the scope of this paper.
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To see why this positive correlation increases the sensitivity of GDP to liquidity
shocks, consider the following example. The metal manufacturing industry has a high
production out-degree - many other industries use metal products intensively. One of
its most important customers is auto manufacturing. Metal manufacturing also has a
high credit out-degree - these firms sell a lot of output on credit. Suppose that firms
in auto manufacturing are hit with a liquidity shock; i.e. banks reduce the supply of
credit to these firms. These firms will then reduce their cash-in-advance payments
to their suppliers in metal manufacturing (cia the credit linkage channel). Because
these suppliers are quite dependent on receiving these payments from their customers
in auto manufacturing, they experience a sharp tightening of liquidity. This forces
them to cut back on production. As a result, other industries experience a sharp drop
in the supply of metal goods. Because the rest of the economy uses metal products
intensively, this fall in production has a large impact on aggregate output. Thus,
the liquidity shock to firms in auto manufacturing will have larger aggregate impact
because their suppliers in metal manuf are both more vulnerable to nonpayment and
are important suppliers of goods to rest of economy,
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Figure 2·4: Production out-degree and trade credit use by industry.
The plot indicates that there is a strong positive relationship between the credit
out-degree of an industry and its systemic importance. The correlation between the
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two measures is 0.6. On average, a one standard deviation increase in an industry’s
credit out-degree corresponds to an increase of 0.13 percentage points in the elasticity
of Y with respect to its liquidity, or 0.59 standard deviations. Put differently, a one
percent liquidity shock to an industry will reduce GDP by 0.13 percentage points
more than the same shock to an industry which provides less credit to the economy
by one standard deviation. Therefore, there is a strong association in the model
between an industry’s systemic importance and how important that industry is in
providing credit to the rest of the economy.
2.5.4 Summary of Quantitative Analysis
The quantitative analysis showed that i) the credit linkages between US industries
play a quantitatively significant role in amplifying aggregate and industry-level liq-
uidity shocks, even when allowing for substitutability between bank credit and cash
payments and ii) the systemic importance of an industry depends on how important
for the economy its suppliers are in providing credit.
Therfore an understanding of the role that credit linkages play in propagating
idiosyncratic shocks introduces a new notion of the systemic importance of firms or
industries based on their place in the credit network. The effects of these linkages are
quantitatively important. Therefore, by overlooking the importance of credit linkages
between nonfinancial firms, the literature has missed an important determinant of
what makes an industry or firm systemically important.
2.6 Empirical Analysis
Now that I have established the role that the credit network plays in propagating
shocks, and shown that it can play a quantitatively significant role in generating
fluctuations in aggregate output by amplifying liquidity shocks, I turn to the empirical
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analysis. I ask, in light of the credit linkages we observe between industries in the
US, what role did the credit network of the US play during the Great Recession?
How much of observed aggregate volatility can be accounted for by liquidity versus
productivity shocks? Have idiosyncratic or aggregate shocks played a more important
role in US business cycles? The answers to these questions depends on the nature
and magtinude of the shocks that hit the economy over this period. Therefore, to
answer these questions, I first need to estimate shocks.
My empirical strategy follows a structural factor analysis approach, similar to that
of Foerster et al. (2011), on US industrial production industries at the three-digit
NAICS level. In all, I allow for four types of shocks: aggregate liquidity and pro-
ductivity shocks, and industry-level (idiosyncratic) liquidity and productivity shocks.
This approach involves a two-step procedure for estimating each type of shock. First,
I use the model to back-out the liquidity and productivity shocks which hit each
industry each quarter, using data on each industry’s output growth and employment
growth. Second, I use dynamic factor methods to decompose these shocks into an
aggregate component and an industry-level component. I then feed these estimated
shocks into the model to estimate the role of each type of shock, and the credit
network of US manufacturing industries, in generating observed aggregate volatility.
2.6.1 Data
From the Federal Reserve Board’s Industrial Production Indexes, I observe the growth
rate in output of all manufacturing and mining industries at the three-digit NAICS
level, at the quarterly frequency. There are 23 such industries at this level of detail.
From the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages,
I observe the number of workers employed by all industries at the three-digit NAICS
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level.6 For each dataset, I take 1997 Q1 -2013 Q4 as my sample period. I seasonally-
adjust and de-trend each series.
Looking through the lense of the model, these observed quarterly fluctuations may
be driven by:
1. Industry-level liquidity or productivity shocks
2. Aggregate liquidity or productivity shocks
3. Credit and input-output linkages which propagate these shocks
The answers to my questions of interest depend on the relative importance of each of
these in driving fluctuations. Since my calibrated model tells me how much industry
j’s output or employment changes in response to a liquidity or productivity shock
to i, I use the model to control for the effect of credit and input-output linkages
in propagating shocks across industries. To identify aggregate versus industry-level
components of the estimated shocks, I use standard dynamic factor methods. The
only remaining challenge is to identify how much fluctuations are driven by changes
in productivity versus changes in liquidity.
Most of the literature takes one of two extreme positions on the source of fluctu-
ations: they are assumed to be driven either entirely by productivity shocks (as in
Foerster et al. (2011) and Acemoglu et al. (2012)) or entirely by liquidity shocks (as
in Bigio and La’O (2015)). By making use of both employment and output data, I
make a weaker assumption and allow for both types of shocks. In the next section,
I first describe how I back-out shocks using this data and my model. I then discuss
how my model is able to separately identify liquidity and productivity shocks from
the data on output and employment.
6Hours worked is not directly available at this level of industry detail and this frequency. However,
I will check that hours worked and number workers employed are correlated at lower frequencies and
lower levels of industry detail.
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2.6.2 Identification of Liquidity Shocks versus Productivity Shocks
What allows the model to identify productivity shocks and liquidity shocks sepa-
rately? In other words, how does the model attribute an observed fall in industry i’s
output xit and employment nit to a liquidity shock rather than productivity shock?
In the model, productivity and liquidity shocks have differential effects on labor and
employment.
Productivity shocks work through the Cobb-Douglas production functions, and
directly affect the the amount of labor employed per unit of output produced. Liquid-
ity shocks, on the other hand, do not affect production functions. Rather they work
by affecting the tightness of industry cash-in-advance constraints, and show up as
changes in industry wedges (first-order conditions). The model uses these differential
effects to identify the source of fluctuations in observed output and employment.
In short, the model essentially backs-out productivity shocks from industry-level
Solow residuals, or unexplained changes in output given changes in the factors of
production. Similarly, it backs-out liquidity shocks from unexplained changes in the
ratios of each industry’s labor expenditure to revenue. In equilibrium, this ratio is
equal to the labor share of production (a constant) times the wedge.7 Because the
model can track how a liquidity shock or productivity shock to one industry spills
over to other industries via their credit and input-output linkages, the model can back
out exactly how much of a change in an industry’s output and employment is coming
from spillover effects versus a direct shock, and can identify the industry which was
shocked. A more detailed discussion of this identification procedure is relegated to
Appendix A10.
7See equation (5).
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2.6.3 Using the Model to Back Out Shocks from the Data
Recall that the model yields a system of log-linear equations describing the (first-
order approximated) elasiticity of each equilibrium variable to the liquidity Bi and
productivity zi of each industry i. Suppose that the static model is extended to be
a repeated cross-section. Then these same equations describe the evolution of the
equilibrium variables that occurs each period in response to liquidity and productiv-
ity shocks, to a first-order approximation. I obtain a closed-form solution for this
evolution, which is derived in the Appendix.
Let Xt and Nt denote the M -by-1 dimensional vectors of industry output and
employment growth at time t, x˜it and n˜it, respectively. And let Bt and zt similarly
denote the M -by-1 dimensional vectors of industry liquidity and productivity growth
(i.e. shocks) at time t, B˜it and z˜it, respectively. The closed-form solutions for Xt and
Nt yield
Xt = GXBt +HXzt
Nt = GNBt +HNzt
These respectively describe how each industry’s output and employment changes each
period in response to the liquidity and productivity shocks to every industry. Here,
the M -by-M matrices GX , GN , HX and HN are functions of the economy’s input-
output and credit networks Ω and Θ, and capture the effects of the input-output and
credit linkages in propagating either type of shock across industries, as was described
in the theoretical analysis. The elements of these matrices depend only on the model
parameters, and therefore take their values from my calibration.
I construct Xt and Nt for US industrial production industries (at the three-digit
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NAICS level) from the output and employment data described above. Let Xˆt and Nˆt
denote these observed fluctuations. I then have a system of 2M equations in as many
unknowns for each quarter, and can invert the system to back-out shocks Bt and zt
each quarter from 1997 Q1 to 2013 Q4.
Bt = G
−1
N
(
Nˆt −HNzt
)
zt = Q
−1Xˆt −Q−1GXG−1N Nˆt
where
Q ≡ HX −GXG−1N HN
Thus, I construct liquidity and productivity shocks as the industry-level fluctuations
in output and employment, filtered for the effects of credit and input-output linkages
in propagating them from industry to industry.
Figure 6 shows the time series of the estimated liquidity and productivity shocks
which hit the US auto manufacturing industry each quarter over the sample period.
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Figure 2·5: Estimated liquidity and productivity shocks to auto man-
ufacturing industry.
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From the figure, we can see that the changes in auto manufacturing’s liquidity and
productivity both fluctuate moderately around zero for most of the sample period.
Between 2007 and 2009, the liquidity available to this industry took a sharp drop
for a number of consecutive quarters, reaching up to a 25 percent decline. Over this
period, the industry’s output and employment experienced a large drop attributable
to changes in the labor wedge of the industry. Given the credit linkages, the model
is able to trace how much of the drop in th ewedge is due to a direct liquidity shock
to auto manufacturing versus shocks to other industries being transmitted to it. The
blue line plotted in the figure reflect the direct liquidity shocks experienced each
quarter by the industry.
In addition, the TFP of the industry seems to have not fluctuated greatly over this
recessionary period; in fact, it increased slightly. These features broadly hold across
most industries in industrial production. The aggregate effects of these features and
their interpretation will be discussed in subsequent sections.
2.6.4 Dynamic Factor Analysis
Next, I decompose the changes in industry liquidity and productivity, Bt and zt, into
an aggregate and industry-level shock. I assume that each may be described by a
common component and a residual idiosyncratic component.
Bt = ΛBF
B
t + ut
zt = ΛzF
z
t + vt
Here, FBt and F
z
t are scalars denoting the common factors affecting the output and
employment growth of each industry, respectively, at quarter t. I interpret these fac-
tors as aggregate liquidty and productivity shocks, respectively. The M -by-1 vectors
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ΛB and Λz denote the factor loadings, and map the aggregate shocks into each in-
dustry’s liquidity and productivity shocks. Together, ΛBF
B
t and ΛzF
z
t comprise the
aggregate components of Bt and zt.
The residual components, ut and vt, unexplained by the common factors, are the
idiosyncratic or industry-level shocks affecting each industry’s liquidity and produc-
tivity growth. I assume that
(
FBt , ut
)
and
(
FBt , ut
)
are each serially uncorrelated,
FBt , ut, F
z
t , and vt are mutually uncorrelated, and the variance-covariance matrices
of ut and vt, Σuu and Σvv, are diagonal.
I suppose further that the factors follow an AR(1) process such that
FBt = γBF
B
t−1 + ψ
B
t
F zt = γzF
z
t−1 + ψ
z
t
Here, ψBt and ψ
z
t are independently and identically distributed. Hence, I have two
dynamic factor models; one for the liquidity shocks Bt and one for the productivity
shocks zt.
Use standard methods to estimate the model. To predict the factors, I use both
a one-step prediction method and Kalman smoother. The Kalman smoother yields
factors which explain more of the data. Since it utilizes more infortmation in pre-
dicting the factors, I use this method as my baseline. All subsequent reported results
used the factors predicted using a Kalman smoother.
Figure 7 plos the time series for the estimated liquidity shocks and their aggre-
gate components for the auto manufacturing industry over the full sample period.
The aggregate component explain most of the liquidity shocks suffered by auto man-
ufacturing. These features are fairly representative of those in other industries. A
similar decomposition for the productivity shocks to auto manufacturing is given in
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Appendix A13.
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Figure 2·6: Liquidity shocks to auto manufacturing and their aggre-
gate component.
2.7 Aggregate Liquidity Shocks and the Excess Bond Pre-
mium
To gauge the external validity of the structural factor analysis, I compare the aggre-
gate liquidity shocks estimated using the model with a measure of the risk-bearing
capacity of the US financial sector - namely, the excess bond premium of Gilchrist
and Zakrajsek (2012). If the aggregate shocks estimated using my model are indeed
picking up liquidity shocks to each industry, then the two time series should exhibit
a negative correlation. The correlation between these two time series turns out to be
-0.51.8 This is suggestive evidence that the aggregate liquidity shocks picked up by
the model are indeed reflective of changes in the supply of credit from the financial
sector to the IP industries.
From Figure (8), we can see that, toward the end of 2007, the model picks up
a huge aggregate liquidity shock, of about -20 percent. Simultaneously, the excess
8This finding is robust to using different methods to estimate the factors (e.g. Kalman smoother,
one-step prediction procedure). The correlation ranges between -0.44 and -0.51.
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bond premium exhibits a huge spike, suggesting that the estimated aggregate liqudity
shock captures the severe credit crunch that occurred during the financial crisis.
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Figure 2·7: Excess bond premium and estimated aggregate liquidity
shock.
2.8 Empirical Results
I now present and discuss the empirical results using the shocks estimated in the
previous sections.
2.8.1 Aggregate Volatility Before the Great Recession
In this section, I use the shocks estimated in the previous section to estimate how
much of observed volatility in aggregate industrial production from 1997Q1:2013Q4
can be explained by each type of shock. In addition, I estimate the contribution of
the credit network of the US industrial production industries to aggregate volatility.
What follows is a brief summary of the procedure; a more detailed description is given
in Appendix A11.
Let the variance-covariance matrix of industry output growth Xt be denoted by
ΣXX . In addition, let s¯ denote the M -by-1 vector of industry shares of aggregate
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output during the median year of my sample, 2005. Since these shares are close
to constant across the quarters in my sample, the volatility of aggregate industrial
output - henceforth aggregate volatility - can be approximated by σ2, where
σ2 ≡ s¯′ΣXX s¯
The factor model described above implies the following identities for the variance-
covariance matrices of output growth Xt and those of the shocks Bt and zt.
ΣXX = GXΣBBG
′
X +HXΣzzH
′
X
ΣBB = ΛBΣ
B
FFΛ
′
B + Σuu Σzz = ΛzΣ
z
FFΛ
′
z + Σvv
The fraction of observed aggregate volatility generated by aggregate liquidity shocks
can be computed as the ratio of volatility generated by the aggregate component of
Bt to σ
2.
s¯′GX
(
ΛBΣ
B
FFΛ
′
B
)
G′X s¯
σ2
I estimate the above variance-covariance matrices ΣBB and Σzz using the estimated
liquidity and productivity shocks Bt and zt. Similarly, I estimate the variance-
covariance matrices of the factors and idiosyncratic shocks using the predicted factors
from my factor esimtation, imposing that Σuu and Σvv are diagonal matrices. I find
that, for the full sample period 1997Q1:2013Q4, aggregate volatility in industrial
production is about 0.19%.9
The results of this analysis are summarized in Table (3). The results indicate
9This is roughly in line with the findings of Foerster et al. (2011). If I compute growth rates
and aggregate volatility using the same scaling conventions as they, I find aggregate volatility to be
about 9.35 compared to their 8.8 for 1972-1983 and 3.6 for 1984-2007. The higher volatility that I
get comes from including the Great Recession in my sample period.
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Table 2.3: Pre-Recession Composition of Agg. Vol.: 1997Q1:2006Q4
Fraction of Agg. Vol.
Explained
Productivity Shocks .365
Agg. Component .133
Idios. Component .232
Liquidity Shocks .635
Agg. Component .45
Idios. Component .185
that, before the Great Recession, aggregate volatility was driven primarily by aggre-
gate liquidity shocks and idiosyncratic productivity shocks; aggregate liquidity shocks
account for nearly a half of aggregate volatility. On the other hand, there appears to
be only a minor role for aggregate productivity shocks in generating aggregate fluctu-
ations, accounting for only about 13 percent. Nevertheless, idiosyncratic productivity
shocks still play an important role, accounting for a quarter of aggregate volatility.
Note that idiosyncratic productivity shocks do not average out precisely because of
the input-output linkages connecting industries. Together, idiosyncratic productivity
shocks and aggregate liquidity shocks account for nearly three-quarters of aggregate
volatility during this period.
Next, I evaluate the role of the credit network of industrial production in aggre-
gate volatility. Recall from the quantitative analysis that the credit network amplifies
shocks by transmitting them across industries. How much of the observed aggregate
volatility in industrial production can be accounted for by the credit network ampli-
fying the estimated shocks? The results are summarized in Table (4). Overall, the
credit network accounts for nearly one-fifth of aggregate volatility. Put differently,
in the absence of the credit linkage channel of propagation, aggregate volatility from
1997-2006 would be 17 percent lower. As was discussed in the theoretical analysis,
the credit network primarily propagates liquidity shocks. Indeed, most of the effect
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Table 2.4: Contribution of Credit Network
Contribution of
Credit Network
Effect of Prod. Shocks .019
On Agg. Vol.
Effect of Liq. Shocks .211
On Agg. Vol.
Total Agg. Volatility .171
of the credit network is in amplifying the aggregate liquidity shock.
In summary, the main results of this analysis are that, when taking into account
the credit linkages between industries,
1. Aggregate productivity shocks do not play an important role in aggregate fluc-
tuations in industrial production
2. Aggregate volatility is driven primarily by idiosyncratic productivity shocks and
aggregate liquidity shocks
3. The credit network of the economy plays an important role in amplifying fluc-
tuations in aggregate output
How does this compare to the findings of studies? Foerster et al. (2011) show that,
when accounting for the effects of input-output linkages in propagating shocks across
industries, the role of aggregate productivity shocks in driving the business cycle is
diminished; more of aggregate volatility in IP can be explained by industry-level pro-
ductivity shocks. Nevertheless, they still find a quantitatively large role for aggregate
productivity shocks. On the other hand, my analysis shows that when one takes
into account the credit linkages between non-financial firms in the economy, the role
of aggregate productivity shocks is minimal. On the contrary, aggregate liquidity
shocks seem to play a vital role the business cycle. Indeed, the importance of shocks
emanating from the financial sector to real economy as a whole is well-documented.
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2.8.2 Great Recession
In this section, I perform an accounting exercise to evaluate how much of the peak-to-
trough drop in aggregate industrial production during the Great Recession each type
of shock can explain. To perform this accounting exercise, I do the following. I first
restrict the sample to the time in which the peak-to-trough decline in aggregate IP
occurred: 2007Q4: 2009Q2. For each quarter during this period, I use the estimated
shocks to decompose the drop in aggregate IP into components arising from each
type of shock. For each quarter, this yields a breakdown of the quarterly decline in
aggregate IP across each shock. I then take a weighted sum of these breakdowns
across quarters. I weight each quarterly breakdown by the fraction of the peak-to-
trough decline in aggregate IP accounted for by each quarter. This yields a weighted
average breakdown, describing, on average, how much of the total peak-to-trough
decline in aggregate IP that occurred during the Great Recession can be accounted
for by each type of shock.
I find that both aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity shocks were on aver-
age slightly positive during this period. As such, changes in productivity did not
contribute to the decline in aggregate IP during the recession. On the contrary, the
observed movements in aggregate IP can be accounted for by liquidity shocks. I find
that 73 percent of the drop in aggregate IP is due to an adverse aggregate liquidity
shock. This is natural given the financial crisis that occurred during the beginning of
the recession.
Of the remaining 27 percent not explained by the aggregate liquidity shock, id-
iosyncratic liquidity shocks to the three most systemically important industries can
account for a sizable fraction. Idiosyncratic shocks to the oil and coal products man-
ufacturing, chemical products manufacturing, and auto manufacturing industries ac-
count for between one-third and all of the remaining decline in aggregate IP, despite
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comprising only about 25 percent of aggregate IP. This suggests that idiosynratic
liquidity shocks to a few systemically important industries played a quantitatively
significant role during the Great Recession.
Much of the previous literature has relied on aggregate productivity shocks to
drive the business cycle. Yet by many accounts, this has been an unsatisfactory
explanation due to the lack of direct evidence for such shocks. This paper, however,
finds a minimal role for aggregate productivity shocks in the US business cycle, but
a vital one for aggregate liquidity shocks. Hence, my results suggest that when
one accounts for the effects of credit linkages between industries, aggregate liquidity
shocks seem to displace aggregate productivity shocks as a prominent driver of the US
business cycle. This finding is in line both with growing evidence on the importance of
the financial sector for real activity, and with standard interpretations of the causes of
the Great Recession. Thus, by explicitly accounting for the propagation generated by
credit linkages, this paper captures the importance of financial shocks for aggregate
fluctuations in the real economy.
2.9 Conclusion
In this paper, I show that inter-firm lending plays an important role in business cycle
fluctuations. First, I introduced supplier credit into a network model of the economy.
In this model, a shock to one firm’s liquid funds reduces its ability to make payments
to its suppliers. The credit linkages between firms and their suppliers thus propagate
the firm-level shock across the network, amplifying its aggregate effects. Thus, the
endogenous response in cash-in-advance constraints to liquidity shocks is crucial for
how the economy behaves in response to liquidity shock.
To evaluate the model quantitatively, I constructed a proxy of the credit linkages
between US industries by combining firm-level balance sheet data and industry-level
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input-output data. I then calibrated the model to assess the quantitative importance
of this propagation mechanism. I found that, in response to an aggregate liquidity
shock, the credit network of the US economy accounts for 22 percent of the fall in
GDP. I also showed that US industries which are important suppliers of intermediate
goods are also more vulnerable to nonpayment by their customers. This feature of
the US economy exacerbates the aggregate impact of liqudity shocks.
Finally, I investigated which shocks drive the US business cycle when we account
for the credit linkages between industries. To do so, I used a structural factor ap-
proach to estimate the contribution of productivity and liquidity shocks to observed
aggregate fluctuations in US industrial production (IP) from 1997-2013, and find that
these fluctuations were driven primarily by aggregate liquidity shocks and idiosyn-
cratic productivity shocks. During the Great Recession, productivity shocks played
a minimal role; rather, most of the drop in aggregate IP was driven by an aggregate
liquidity shock. Thus, by explicitly accounting for the credit linkages between indus-
tries, this paper quantitatively and empirically captures the importance of financial
shocks for US business cycle fluctuations.
Chapter 3
Cross-Border Hiring and Unemployment
in a Global Economy
3.1 Introduction
A central issue in international trade is the relationship between international trade
and unemployment. Both empirical and theoretical studies have produced conflicting
evidence with regard to the response of unemployment to trade liberalization. Along
these lines, a more comprehensive study of unemployment and international trade is
needed to shed further light on their relationship.
In this paper, I develop a unique framework for examining the relationship be-
tween international trade and unemployment by allowing for cross-border hiring by
firms, in which firms can hire labor both domestically and abroad. Foreign workers
act as marketing agents who reduce the unit trade costs of exporting firms. Labor
market frictions induce a response in the unemployment rate to trade liberalization
via expected worker income and wages. This model incorporates important features
of product and labor markets, and is novel in allowing for cross-border hiring. This
framework is tractable and demonstrates that models in the literature which ignore
cross-border hiring likely underestimate the upward force of trade liberalization on
unemployment.
I incorporate Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides labor market search and matching
frictions into a framework with heterogeneous firms who can engage in cross-border
64
65
hiring – i.e. hire labor both domestically and abroad. Productivity is entirely firm-
specific and directly observable by the firm. Labor market frictions induce multilateral
bargaining between firms and their workers. In this framework, firms can export to
the other country and can hire workers both domestically and abroad. There is a
unit export cost which is a decreasing function of the measure of foreign workers that
a firm has hired. While hiring foreign labor reduces an exporting firm’s trade costs,
it does not directly increase the productive capacity of the firm, as hiring domestic
labor does. The model is static, but the equilibria it produces are identical to the
steady state equilibria that would prevail in a dynamic equivalent. Upon embedding
the model in general equilibrium, I analyze how equilibrium unemployment changes
when a country undergoes trade liberalization. Since my analysis relies on comparing
static equilibria before and after liberalization, it is essentially a long-run analy-
sis of the change in unemployment when a country experiences trade liberalization.
Whether a firm produces, exports, or hires foreign labor in equilibrium is determined
entirely by its productivity draw. When a country undergoes trade liberalization,
more productive firms produce more and earn more revenue. My analysis shows, in
accordance with Melitz (2003), that when trading countries experience liberalization,
there is a reallocation of resources toward more productive firms in both countries.
Hence, there is an increase in the minimum and average productivity of producing
firms in equilibrium. The same is true for firms that export and hire foreign labor.
The main result of this paper is that there are two channels through which trade
liberalization affects unemployment. The first is through the expected income of
a worker in the country: trade liberalization pushes the unemployment rate down
through a rise in expected worker income. The second result of this paper is that trade
liberalization pushes the unemployment rate up via a rise in wages. The intuition
for this is that liberalization causes less productive firms to exit, leaving only the
66
most productive firm to produce and engage in cross-border hiring in equilibrium.
These more productive firms pay higher wages, which means that, in aggregate, firms
want to hire fewer workers. Jobless workers who would have been hired by less
productive firms before liberalization, are now left unemployed because of the smaller
availability of jobs. The fact that the model produces separate and opposing effects
on unemployment of expected worker income and wages is a direct result of the
frictions in labor markets. This paper also outlines the conditions under which one
effect dominates and thus yields a clear prediction about which effect should dominate,
given a reasonable parameterization. Hence, this paper helps open the door for future
research that could shed light on the relationship between trade and unemployment.
My analysis shows that cross-border hiring has significant implications for the
magnitude of the response of unemployment to trade liberalization. Cross-border
hiring enhances the quantitative effect of liberalization on unemployment. The fact
that the unemployment rate in a country depends in part on the hiring behavior of
foreign firms magnifies the wage effect on unemployment. Hence, the framework I
outline in this paper shows that cross-border hiring enhances the sensitivity of the
unemployment rate to liberalization. This represents the paper’s main contribution
to the literature.
This paper is related to a literature examining the relationship between trade
and unemployment which emphasizes the role of labor market frictions analyzing the
macroeconomic effects of trade. Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010) develop a
model with search and matching frictions in the labor market and worker screening
to analyze the effects of opening to trade on unemployment and the distribution of
wages. They find that while opening to trade unambiguously raises wage inequality,
the net effects on unemployment are unclear. Similar methods were used by Helpman
and Itskhoki (2009) to examine how the unemployment rate changes when a coun-
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try opens to trade. They find that the response of unemployment depends on the
parameterization of search and matching frictions in the country’s labor market, but
that lower frictions do not, in general, imply that the unemployment rate falls when
a country opens to trade. Cosar (2011) develops a dynamic model of labor market
frictions and human capital accumulation to examine the dynamic response of labor
markets to trade liberalization, finding that frictions and human capital accumulation
can explain the slow transition of unemployment after liberalization. Felbermayr et
al. (2008) incorporate Mortensen-Pissarides search frictions into the Melitz (2003)
framework and find that trade liberalization unambiguously decreases a country’s
unemployment rate for reasonable parameter values.
None of these papers allow for cross-border hiring by firms, and hence ignore a
potentially significant determinant of a country’s unemployment rate. My main point
of departure from these studies is to allow for cross-border hiring, thereby obtaining
a more comprehensive and descriptive picture of the effects of trade liberalization on
unemployment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines the model, sec-
toral equilibrium, and embeds the model in general equilibrium. Section III presents
the results, specifically with regard to the effects of trade liberalization on the unem-
ployment rate. Section IV concludes and Section V, the appendix, contains technical
details.
3.2 Model
Environment
The initial setup of the model is essentially the same as in Melitz (2003). As such, it
incorporates Melitz (2003) of heterogeneous firms I consider a world with two coun-
tries, Home (H) and Foreign (F). Variables in country F are denoted by an asterisk. In
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each country, there is a continuum of households (workers) and a continuum of firms,
each firm producing a different variety. The set of different goods in H is denoted J,
and L denotes the measure of workers who populate H. As in Melitz, each agent has
preferences given by a CES utility function over a continuum of goods, indexed by j,
where the utility function is given below by Ω.
Ω =
∫
jJ
p(j)ρd j
1/ρ (3.1)
It is assumed that the goods are substitutes, so that ρ  (0, 1), and the elasticity of
substitution between any two goods is σ = 1/ (1− ρ) > 1. The well-known result of
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) is that we can model consumer behavior by treating the set
of varieties as an aggregate good Q ≡ Ω, with an associated aggregate price given by
P =
∫
j  J
p(j)1−σd j
 11−σ (3.2)
From now on, all quantities are measured in terms of the aggregate consumption
good Q. Denoting aggregate expenditure on all varieties within the sector by R and
the price of variety j by p(j), the demand for variety j can then be expressed as
q(j) = A
1
1−ρp(j)
−1
1−ρ , where A = R1−ρP ρ is interpreted as a demand shifter. Defining
equilibrium firm revenue as r(j) = p(j)q(j), it follows this specification of sectoral
demand that
r(j) = Aq(j)ρ (3.3)
Given (1)-(3), the aggregate optimal consumption and expenditure decisions, re-
spectively, in the economy for each variety j are:
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q(j) = Q
[
p(j)
p
]−σ
and r(j) = R
[
p(j)
p
]1−σ
(3.4)
Here, total expenditure on varieties within the sector (aggregate revenue) is R =
PQ =
∫
jJ
r(j)1−σd j. Each firm faces a residual demand curve with constant elastic-
ity σ, and therefore chooses the same profit-maximizing markup equal to σ/(σ−1) =
1/ρ. As in Melitz, I model higher productivity as producing a symmetric variety at
a lower marginal cost. The pricing rule is therefore
p(ϕ) =
w
ρϕ
=
1
ρϕ
= MC ∗markup (3.5)
where w is a common wage rate normalized to 1. Plugging (5) into (4) yields
r(ϕ) = R(Pρϕ)σ−1 (3.6)
Production Technology
I now specify the production technology in more detail. I assume that each country
has a number of sectors of the economy, in which the production technology may differ.
When I later embed the model in general equilibrium, I will impose the assumption
that both countries one sector. The production technology is as follows. Output y
of each variety depends on the firm’s productivity ϕ, and the measure of domestic
workers hired by a firm in country i  {H,F} is given by lid.
yi(ϕ) = ϕlid(ϕ) (3.7)
This production technology is essentially the same as in Melitz (2003), but differs from
that of Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010) in that all productivity is entirely
firm-specific.
There is a competitive fringe of potential firms who can enter the differentiated
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sector by paying entry cost fe > 0, measured in terms of the aggregate consumption
good Q. Once a firm has paid this cost, it draws its productivity ϕ from a Pareto
distribution G(ϕ) = 1 − (ϕmin/ϕ)z, where z¿1 and ϕmin > 0. A firm can enter
at most one sector – i.e. any firm draws a productivity level at most one time.
Based on its productivity draw, the firm decides whether to produce (domestically)
or exit. The firm then decides whether to exit, produce only domestically, produce for
both the domestic and export markets, or produce for both markets and hire foreign
labor. A firm is said to be producing domestically if it employs a domestic worker,
and producing abroad if it employs a foreign worker. A firm in a given country
is either idle; producing only domestically; producing domestically and exporting;
or producing domestically, exporting, and producing abroad (i.e. producing using
additional foreign labor). These decisions are described by productivity thresholds
which will be described below.
It will be shown that there is a cutoff productivity ϕd such that a firm decides to
produce if and only if it draws a productivity level ϕ ≥ ϕd. If it decides to produce,
it pays a fixed domestic production cost fd. It then decides the measure domestic
workers to hire ld at the unit hiring cost bd. The workers and the firm then engage
in Nash bargaining to split the surplus that results from production. I normalize the
value of remaining unemployed to zero. Therefore, the decision of a contacted worker
whether or not to accept the job is trivial, since the share of firm revenue received
by the worker as a wage is non-zero (if it were not, then the firm would not have
contacted the worker to begin with). For this reason, the job acceptance decisions by
workers are ignored in this paper. The firm then decides whether or not to export to
(sell output to consumers in) the other country. If it decides to export, it pays a fixed
export cost fx (in addition to fd) and an export cost τ(lf ) > 1 per unit of the good
it exports. More precisely, the unit export cost τ of an exporting firm in country i is
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decreasing in the measure of foreign workers that the firm has hiredlif (giving firms
incentive to hire labor from abroad), and will be specified later. As in Melitz (2003),
firms that export in equilibrium are larger and more productive than those that do
not. It will be shown that there is a cutoff productivity ϕx such that a firm exports
in equilibrium if and only if its productivity draw ϕ satisfies ϕ ≥ ϕx will export in
equilibrium. An exporting firm then decides whether or not to hire foreign workers.
While these workers do not contribute to production, they reduce the export costs.
As such, firms who do not export have no incentive to hire foreign workers. If the firm
decides to hire foreign workers, it pays a fixed foreign hiring cost ff (in addition to fd
and fx) and a unit hiring cost bf . It will be show that there is a cutoff productivity
ϕf such that a firm hires foreign labor in equilibrium if and only if its productivity
draw ϕ satisfies ϕ ≥ ϕf .
I now specify the unit export cost in more detail. Recall that an exporting firm
must export τ > 1 units of the good for 1 unit of the good to arrive in the foreign
country. This unit export cost is a function of the measure lf of foreign workers hired
by the exporting firm, the elasticity of substitution between varieties ¿1/2 , and a
parameter η > 1.
τ(lf ) =
(
η
1 + lf
) 1
2ρ−1
, τ ′ < 0 , τ ′′ > 0 (3.8)
The parameter η determines the unit export cost of firms which do not hire foreign
labor, and hence is assumed to be greater than one. The restriction ρ > 1/2 ensures
that a firm’s unit export cost τ is decreasing in the measure of foreign workers lf that
it hires. It is important to note that by the specification of production and the unit
export cost, a firm cannot directly increase its production capacity by hiring foreign
workers, but rather can only reduce its export costs. The more a firm hires workers
from the other country, the less its unit export cost. However, the strict convexity of
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the unit export cost implies that there is no amount of foreign labor that a firm can
hire to eliminate all of its unit export cost. Therefore, by hiring foreign workers, the
firm is essentially undergoing an improvement in technology. In this sense, foreign
workers act as agents who help market the firm’s variety abroad, and thus facilitate
a reduction in the unit export cost without directly contributing to production. This
specification of unit export costs allows for analytical tractability. More precisely,
the exponent in the expression for τ(lf ) allows for a closed-form representation of the
firm’s optimal measure of foreign workers lf to hire, which will be derived later.
Because consumers have a love of variety and because of the fixed export cost,
no firm will ever choose to export and not produce domestically. Similarly, because
the only function of hiring foreign labor is to reduce export costs, no firm will choose
to hire foreign labor if it is not exporting. In short, all firms which hire foreign
labor both produce domestically and export, and all firms which export also produce
domestically.
Labor Markets
In each sector, there are two labor markets – a domestic and foreign labor market – in
which workers search for employment from domestic and foreign firms, respectively.
Each market exhibits frictional search and matching, which is modeled using the stan-
dard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides approach. A worker searches for employment in
exactly one sector, and can choose to search for a foreign job or a domestic job in
this sector. A firm in a particular sector can choose how many workers to contact
domestically and abroad. In any period, a worker in a given country is either unem-
ployed, employed by a domestic firm, or employed by a foreign firm. From a worker’s
perspective, the only difference between a foreign job and a domestic job is the wage
they pay. As such, this model ignores issues of worker migration by assuming a worker
does not need to relocate if hired by a foreign firm.
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Once a worker is hired by a firm, the worker and firm engage in Nash bargaining, in
the manner described in Stole and Zwiebel (1996), with equal weights over the division
of revenue from production. Nash bargaining between the firm and its workers occurs
such that the firm’s share of revenue is given exogenously by γ  (0, 1), while the
worker’s share is 1 − γ. The outside option for hired workers is normalized to zero,
so that workers get zero utility from being unemployed.
I let bd and bf denote the unit search cost for matching with domestic and foreign
workers, respectively. These search costs will be determined endogenously in sectoral
equilibrium. If a firm pays a search cost of bdn units of the aggregate consumption
index, it can randomly match with a measure of n domestic workers. A firm’s search
cost in the foreign labor market, however, is assumed to be increasing in firm revenue,
and is given by bfr(ϕ)n.
While this specification of search costs improves the tractability of the model,
it is easily justifiable: firms with higher revenue are usually more productive, and
therefore prefer to hire workers of a higher skillset. But hiring more productive
workers often entails some search and screening costs which increase as the desired
worker productivity increases. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the higher a
firm’s revenue, the higher its productivity, and so the higher its marginal search cost
for skilled workers. While workers are homogeneous in this model, this representation
of the search cost as an increasing function of firm revenue is thus a reduced form
representation of worker screening in Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010), that
firms screen the workers they contact and screen their productivities at a cost. The
unit search costs (bd, bf ) are determined endogenously by the tightness of the labor
market, and are explained in further detail below.
Let Nd, Nf denote the measure of workers sampled in the sector by domestic and
foreign firms, respectively, and let U id and U
i
f denote the measure of workers searching
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for employment in the domestic and foreign labor markets of the sector, respectively.
Also, let the total measure of workers in the sector searching for employment be given
by U i = U id + U
i
f . For a country i, market tightness is defined in the standard way,
where k  {H,F} and k 6= i:
xid =
N id
U id
, xif =
Nkf
U if
(3.9)
xi =
N id +N
i
f
U i
Here, xid and x
i
f denote the market tightness in the domestic and foreign labor
markets, respectively, in country i  {H,F}, and also represent the probability that a
worker searching for employment in the domestic or foreign labor market is hired. The
unit search costs are specified as follows for country i using the standard Diamond-
Mortensen-Pissarides approach, in which unit search cost for the domestic and foreign
labor markets (bd and bf ) are increasing in the market tightness of the domestic and
foreign labor market (xd and xf ), respectively.
bid = α
d
0
(
xid
)αd1 , bif = αf0 (xif)αf1 , αd0, αf0 > 1 , αd1, αf1 > 0 (3.10)
The restrictions on the alpha parameters ensure that search costs are increasing in
market tightness to reflect that when there is little supply for labor relative to demand,
it is costlier for firms to search for workers.
Firm’s Problem
Since no firm will ever export and not serve the domestic market, an exporting firm
allocates output to equate its marginal revenue in the domestic and export markets.
r′d(ϕ) = r
′
x(ϕ)
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Using (3), and letting yd(ϕ) and yx(ϕ) denote the amount of an exporting firm’s
output supplied to the domestic and export markets respectively, this condition can
be written as the following. For simplicity of notation, I suppress country superscripts
here, but denote the demand shifter of the ‘other’ country Ak.
(
yx(ϕ)
yd(ϕ)
)1−ρ
= τ(lf )
−ρA
k
A
(3.11)
I define total output as the sum of output for the domestic and export markets,
y(ϕ) = yd(ϕ) + yx(ϕ). Then (11) implies that
yd(ϕ) =
y(ϕ)
Γ(ϕ)
, yd(ϕ) =
y(ϕ) [Γ(ϕ)− 1]
Γ(ϕ)
(3.12)
Here, ∆(ϕ) = 1 + Ix(ϕ)τ(lf )
−ρ
1−ρ
(
Ak
A
) 1
1−ρ
captures the firm’s “market access”, or
whether or not the firm chooses to serve both the domestic and export markets,
where Ix(ϕ) is an indicator function which takes the value of 1 if the firm is an
exporter. Note that if the firm is not an exporter, ∆ = 1. I define total firm revenue
by r(ϕ) = rd(ϕ) + rx(ϕ) so that (3) and (10) imply
r(ϕ) = Ayd(ϕ)
ρ + Ak
[
yx(ϕ)
τ(lf )
]ρ
= ∆(ϕ)1−ρAy(ϕ)ρ (3.13)
where rd(ϕ) = Ayd(ϕ)
ρ = r(ϕ)
∆(ϕ)
, and rx(ϕ) = A
k
[
yx(ϕ)
τ(lf )
]ρ
= r(ϕ)[∆(ϕ)−1]
∆(ϕ)
. Suppressing
the country superscripts, the firm’s problem is as follows. The firm chooses the
measures of domestic and foreign workers to hire ld, lf and whether or not to export,
to maximize its profit. Using (13):
pi(ϕ) = max
ld,lf
{
γ∆(ϕ)1−ρAy(ϕ, ld)ρ − fd − Ixfx − Ifff − bdld − bfr(ϕ)lf
}
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s.t. Ix  {0, 1} , If  {0, 1}
where If  {0, 1} takes the value of 1 if the firm has hired any foreign workers. The
presence of a fixed production cost fd implies that there is a zero-profit productivity
cutoff ϕd such that a firm exits without producing if and only if its productivity
ϕ satisfies ϕ < ϕd. Similarly, the presence of a fixed export cost fx implies that
there is an export productivity cutoff ϕx such that a firm exports if and only if its
productivity ϕ satisfies ϕ ≥ ϕx. Finally, the same reasoning implies there is a foreign
hiring productivity cutoff ϕf such that a firm hires foreign labor if and only if ϕ ≥ ϕf .
Each of these cutoff productivities will be defined and discussed later.
Defining ∆x = ∆(ϕ) for all ϕ ≥ ϕx, the firm market access variable can then be
written as:
∆(ϕ) =

1 if ϕ < ϕx
∆x otherwise
(3.14)
where
∆x = 1 + τ(lf )
−ρ
1−ρ
(
Ak
A
) 1
1−ρ
> 1
The first order conditions of the firm’s problem are:
ld : bdld(ϕ) = γρr(ϕ) (3.15)
lf : τ
′(lf )
1
1−ρ + Ix(ϕ)
(
Ak
A
) 1
1−ρ
τ ′(lf )
1
1−ρ τ(lf )
−ρ
1−ρ =
−ργ
bfr(ϕ)
r(ϕ)Ix(ϕ)
(
Ak
A
) 1
1−ρ
(3.16)
The first order condition for lf is a quadratic equation. Therefore, this yields an
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explicit solution for lf as a function of ϕ – i.e. the policy function lf (ϕ).
The first order conditions (15) and (16) define the firm policy functions for ld and
lf . It can be seen that the measure of domestic workers a firm hires is proportional
to the firm’s revenue. This is an unsurprising result, as larger, more productive firms
tend to hire more workers both at home and abroad. Plugging the policy functions
into the expression for revenue and profit yields explicit expressions of firm revenue
and firm profit as functions of firm productivity ϕ.
r(ϕ) =
[
1 + Ix(ϕ)η
ρ
(ρ−1)(2ρ−1)
(
Ak
A
) 1
1−ρ
(1 + lf (ϕ))
ρ
(1−ρ)(2ρ−1)
][
A
(
γρϕ
bd
)] 1
1−ρ
(3.17)
= Γ(ϕ)
[
A
(
γρϕ
bd
)] 1
1−ρ
pi(ϕ) = [γ(1− ρ)− bf lf (ϕ)] r(ϕ)− fd − Ix(ϕ)fx (3.18)
I assume that bargaining weights of both domestic and foreign workers are the
same. Then a firm in country i pays domestic and foreign workers wages wid and w
i
f
respectively, and the firm receives the residual ri −widlid −wif lif , which I call net firm
revenue. For a firm in a given country, the wage of a domestic or foreign worker must
equal the marginal net firm revenue of labor of this kind. This yields the following
equations.
∂
∂ ld
[r(ld, lf )− wd(ld, lf )ld − wf (ld, lf )lf ] = wd (3.19)
∂
∂ lf
[r(ld, lf )− wd(ld, lf )ld − wf (ld, lf )lf ] = wf
This system of differential equations in (wd, wf ), for each country, can be solved
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numerically, given the initial conditions wd(0, 0) = wf (0, 0) = 0, yielding the wages
for each country.
Labor Market Tightness and Search Costs
I assume that workers are risk-neutral, as in the baseline case of Helpman, Itskhoki,
and Redding (2010), and so the supply of workers searching for employment depends
on their expected income outside the sector. Recall that a worker can choose to search
for a foreign job or a domestic job in a given sector. Then a worker is indifferent
between searching for a job inside or outside a sector if and only if the expected
incomes of a domestic and foreign job in the sector are equal to the value of the
worker’s outside opportunity ω. Denoting ωid and ω
i
f as the outside opportunities
to a worker in country i of having a domestic and foreign job respectively, these
conditions are as follows.
ωid = x
i
dw
i
d(ϕ) (3.20)
ωif = x
i
fw
k
f (ϕ)
ωi = ωid = ω
i
f (3.21)
where k  {H,F} and k 6= i. It is worth noting that the frictions in labor markets
prevent wages across countries from equalizing. From (20), note that a worker has the
same outside option regardless of the sector or type of job (domestic or foreign) that
he has. The value of the worker’s outside option ωi can therefore be interpreted as
expected worker income for a worker in country i. Equations (20) and (21) show that
domestic and foreign labor market tightness are inversely related to the domestic and
foreign wages, respectively, and are proportional to expected worker income. This
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is intuitive, since an increase in the wage should cause an increase in the supply of
labor relative to the demand, causing a drop in labor market tightness. Similarly, an
increase in expected worker income ω should cause an increase in demand for goods,
causing firms to want to increase their production, create an increase in the demand
for labor relative to the supply, and hence result in a rise in labor market tightness.
Equations (20) and (21) yield solutions for (xd, xf ) for given values of (ωd, ωf ) and
(wd, wf ). Since (wd, wf ) is determined in (19), we thus have a solution for (xd, xf ) as
a function of (ωd, ωf ). Using (10), this in turn yields solutions for (bd, bf ) in terms of
(ωd, ωf ). In particular, these solutions are below.
bd = α
d
0
(
ω
wd
)αd1
, bf = α
f
0
(
ω
wf
)αf1
(3.22)
Given the restrictions on the alpha parameters in (10), equations (22) imply that
domestic and foreign search costs are increasing in expected worker income and de-
creasing in the domestic and foreign wage, respectively.
Productivity Cutoffs
I now derive the conditions which yield the productivity cutoff levels, mentioned
above, that determine which firms produce domestically, export, and hire abroad
based on firm productivity draws. The Zero Cutoff Profit (ZCP) condition requires
that the profits of the firm with the lowest productivity in equilibrium must be zero.
Letting ϕd denote the lowest firm productivity in equilibrium, the ZCP condition is:
pi(ϕd) = 0
Using (17) and (18), this condition is equivalent to
γ(1− ρ)
[
A
(
γρϕd
bd
)ρ] 11−ρ
= fd (ZCP )
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The ZCP condition pins down the cutoff productivity ϕd as a function of param-
eters and the demand shifter A. When we embed the sectoral economy in general
equilibrium, in turn solving for the demand shifter A, the ZCP will yield ϕd as a
function of only parameters. A similar condition, called the Exporting Cutoff (EC)
condition, is applicable for the exporting cutoff ϕx. A firm with productivity ϕx
must be indifferent between producing only domestically and producing domestically
and exporting. An argument akin to that for the ZCP condition applies to the EC
condition: if the profit earned from exports for a firm with ϕx were negative, the
firm would not exit; if it were positive, there would be firms with ϕ < ϕx which also
export, contradicting the definition of ϕx. This EC condition is given below.
γ(1− ρ)
[
A
(
γρϕx
bd
)ρ] 11−ρ
[∆x − 1] = fx (EC)
The EC condition pins down the cutoff productivity ϕx as a function of the model
parameters and the demand shifter A. Finally, a firm with productivity ϕfor should
be indifferent between paying the fixed foreign hiring cost ffor and hiring its desired
measure of foreign workers and not. This, I call the Foreign Hiring Cutoff Condition
and it pins down the cutoff productivity ϕfor.
γ(1− ρ)
[
A
(
γρϕf
bd
)ρ] 11−ρ
[∆x (lf (ϕf ))−∆x(lf = 0)] = ffor (FHC)
Because of the complexity of the expression for lf (ϕf ), the FHC condition cannot
be solved explicitly for ϕf . In any case, the above three conditions can be solved for
the cutoff productivities to yield the following closed-form expressions for ϕd and ϕx
, and the implicit solution for ϕf .
ϕd =
bd
γρA1/ρ
(
fd
γ(1− ρ)
) 1−ρ
ρ
(3.23)
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ϕx =
bdτ(lf )
γρ (Ak)1/ρ
(
fx
γ(1− ρ)
) 1−ρ
ρ
ϕx =
bd
γρA1/ρ
(
fx
γ(1− ρ)υ
) 1−ρ
ρ
where
υ =
[
Ak
A
] 1
1−ρ
η
ρ
(ρ−1)(2ρ−1)
(
1− [1 + lf (ϕf )]
ρ
(1−ρ)(2ρ−1)
)
Using the above solutions for the cutoff productivities, it should first be noted
that it was assumed that η > 1 and ρ > 1/2. Then from (23) it can be seen that
a sufficient condition for ϕd < ϕx is that fx ≥ fd. In other words, it suffices that
the fixed cost for domestic production is no smaller than the fixed cost required for
exporting for ϕd < ϕx. It is worth noting here that by the definition of ϕf , lf (ϕ) = 0
for all ϕ < ϕf . Then it follows that lf (ϕd) = lf (ϕx) = 0.
There is an additional Free Entry (FE) condition that the expected profit of an
entering firm must be zero, using the assumption that there is free firm entry. It is
worth noting that free entry here does not mean costless entry, as there are entry
costs; rather, it means ‘unrestricted’ entry in that there exists an endless pool of
potential firms who, if profitable, can pay the entry cost and enter the economy at
any period. Freely entering and exiting firms will drive expected firm profit to zero:
∞∫
ϕd
pi(ϕ) d dG(ϕ) = fe (FE)
After solving for general equilibrium, I will show that the FE and ZCP conditions
define two relationships between average firm profit and the domestic productivity
cutoff ϕd and use them to solve for their unique sectoral equilibrium values.
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Additional Conditions Determining Sectoral Equilibrium
Recall that, in equilibrium, the outside opportunities for a worker in a country must
be the same if the worker is searching for a job in the domestic or the foreign labor
market. In addition, we have the following market clearing conditions for the domestic
and foreign labor markets in a given country: the total expected worker income for all
workers searching for employment in the domestic labor market must equal the total
wages actually paid to domestic workers by all firms in the sector. The analogous
market clearing condition for the foreign labor market is that for a country i, the total
expected worker income for all workers searching for employment in the foreign labor
market must equal the total wages actually paid to foreign workers (in i) by foreign
firms (in the other country) in the sector. I let M i, M ix, and M
i
f denote the measure of
firms in country i who produce domestically, export, and engage in cross-border hiring,
respectively. Note that by definition, M i ≥ M ix ≥ M if . (Recall that all firms that
produce in equilibrium produce domestically, and all firms that hire foreign workers
are exporters). Then these two conditions are expressed mathematically below. For
a country i, where i, k  {H,F} and k 6= i,
ωidU
i
d = M
i
∫
ϕid
wid(ϕ)l
i
d(ϕ) dG(ϕ) (3.24)
ωifU
i
f = M
k
f
∫
ϕkf
wkf (ϕ)l
k
f (ϕ) dG(ϕ)
The intuition behind these conditions is as follows. Take the version of (24) for the
domestic labor market. If the left-hand side were greater than the right-hand side,
then more unemployed workers would search for employment outside the domestic
labor market, reducing Ud and the left-hand side. On the other hand, if the left-hand
side were less than the right-hand side, then less unemployed workers would search
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for employment outside the domestic labor market, raising Ud and the left-hand side.
Therefore, the equality must hold in equilibrium.
There is also a market clearing condition for product markets: the sum of domestic
and foreign revenues that supply varieties to the domestic market must equal the total
domestic expenditure on differentiated varieties. Then for i, k  {H,F} and k 6= i,
Ri = M i
∫
ϕid
rid(ϕ)l
i
d(ϕ) dG(ϕ) +M
k
x
∫
ϕkx
rkx(ϕ) dG(ϕ) (3.25)
I now impose the simplifying assumption that the fixed foreign hiring cost ff is
zero. While this assumption improves tractability, it is inconsequential for the central
results of the model. All exporting firms will then hire some measure of foreign
workers, and so the cutoff productivity for foreign hiring ϕf will fall to equalize with
that of exporting ϕx so that ϕf = ϕx. Then the mass of exporting firms is identical
to that of firms who engage in cross-border hiring, so that for country i, M ix = M
i
f .
(26) Note also that this assumption implies that
∞∫
ϕid
rid(ϕ) dG(ϕ) =
∫
ϕid
wid(ϕ)l
i
d(ϕ) dG(ϕ) (3.26)
∞∫
ϕix
rix(ϕ) dG(ϕ) =
∫
ϕif
wif (ϕ)l
i
f (ϕ) dG(ϕ) (3.27)
Then we have a system of ten unknowns (U id, U
i
f ,M
i
x,M
i
f ,M
i for all i  {H,F}) and
ten equations (24-27), yielding solutions to these variables in terms of firm revenue,
wages, policy functions, and aggregate expenditure. All of these have been solved for
already, with the exception of expected worker income in each labor market. This will
be pinned down when I embed the model in general equilibrium in the next section.
I also define U i to be the total measure of workers in country i seeking employment.
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U i ≡ U id + U if (3.28)
General Equilibrium
In this section, I embed the model in general equilibrium, determining expected
worker income ω, aggregate income Θ, and prices. Here, I impose the assumption
that the economy has only a single sector. However, as demonstrated by Helpman,
Itskhoki, and Redding (2010), the analysis generalizes in a straightforward manner
to the case in which there are multiple sectors in the economy, when each sector con-
tains a continuum of horizontally-differentiated varieties. It will be shown that under
this framework, expected worker income will change as a result of a liberalization of
trade. Consequently, the results of this section have important implications for how
the unemployment rate responds to trade liberalization.
All fixed costs are denominated in terms of the aggregate consumption index Q.
An implicit assumption here is that these fixed costs require use of output of each
differentiated variety in the exact same way that consumers demand each variety. I
choose the aggregate consumption index in H as the numeraire so that P = 1. Then
the equations for the demand shifter in F and total expenditure in F yields the price
index in F. Since P = 1, it follows that
A = R1−ρ (3.29)
and
R = Q (3.30)
So we have
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A = Q1−ρ (3.31)
From the ZCP condition and equations (22) and (25), we then have the following
equation in Q and ω.
Q =
fd
γ(1− ρ)
 γρϕd
αd0
[
ω
wd
]αd1

ρ
ρ1
(3.32)
Also, there is an additional market clearing condition relating the aggregate con-
sumption index Q and expected worker income ω which states that aggregate expen-
diture must equal aggregate income, where I have replaced R with Q:
γQ = Uω (3.33)
Then (32) and (33) determine Q and ω.
Q =
U
γ
 fdγ(1− ρ)
 γρϕd
αd0
[
1
wd
]αd1

ρ
ρ−1

ρ−1
ρ(αd1+1)−1
(3.34)
Since ϕd is given by (26), wd is determined in (20), and U is given by (29), this
determines ω and Q as functions of the model parameters. Since 0 < ρ < 1 and
αd1 > 0, expected worker income ω is positively related to the domestic wage wd and
the domestic cutoff productivity ϕd. The intuition for this is straightforward: a higher
domestic cutoff productivity means that the minimum and average productivity of
producing firms is higher, and hence the wages that workers earn should be higher,
which means that workers earn more income on average. Aggregate income is then
the expected worker income given above multiplied by the supply of labor in the
economy.
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3.2.1 Results
Effects of Trade Liberalization on Productivity Cutoff Levels
In this section, I utilize the results of Melitz (2003) in order to determine the quali-
tative response of the equilibrium values of the cutoff productivity levels respond to
trade liberalization. The standard prediction of Melitz (2003), under the assumptions
of firm heterogeneity and fixed entry and export costs, is that when a country ex-
periences trade liberalization, there is a reallocation of resources to more productive
firms. Product markets become more competitive, forcing less productive and smaller
firms to exit, leaving larger more productive firms to produce more. As a result, the
average productivity level of producing firms increases. Therefore, less productive
firms are forced to exit and the minimal productivity level ϕd of firms producing in
equilibrium rises. The assumptions central to these results hold in this framework,
so that ϕd increases after liberalization in this model as well. The mathematical
reasoning has been relegated to the appendix.
Given that ϕd increases unambiguously when an economy experiences liberaliza-
tion, I now determine how the other productivity cutoff levels, ϕx and ϕf , are affected
by liberalization. To do this, I express ϕd as a function of ϕx, and ϕx as a function
of ϕf . Taking the ratio of both sides of the ZCP and the EC conditions yields the
following.
γ(1− ρ)rd(ϕd)
γ(1− ρ)rx(ϕx) =
fd
fd + fx
(3.35)
Using the production function, the first order conditions of the firm’s problem,
and equations (9) and (16), this yields
ϕd(ϕx) = ϕx(
fdB
fd + fx
)
1−ρ
ρ (3.36)
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Here,
B ≡ A
k
A
(
[γ(ϕx)− 1]
τ(lf (ϕx))
)ρ
Thus, I have expressed ϕd as a function of ϕx. From (36) we can see that there is a
linear relationship between ϕd and ϕx. Then ϕx also increases (by the same proportion
as ϕd) when the economy opens to trade. I now perform the same operations to
produce ϕx as a function of ϕf . Taking the ratio of both sides of the EC and FHC
conditions imply the following relationship.
γ(1− ρ)rx(ϕx)
γ(1− ρ)rx(ϕf ) =
fx
ff
Using the first order conditions and equations (10) and (15) yields the following.
ϕx(ϕf ) =
(
fx
ff
) 1−ρ
ρ
(
τ(ϕx)
∆(ϕx)− 1
)1−ρ
ϕf
τ(lf (ϕf ))
(3.37)
Thus, I have expressed ϕx in terms of ϕf . (It is worth noting that in the expressions
for τ(ϕx) and ∆(ϕx), ϕx does not appear). However, from (37) it is not immediately
clear how ϕx depends on ϕf . To determine how ϕf must change after liberalization,
I take the derivative of ϕx(ϕf ) with respect to ϕf .
dϕx(ϕf )
dϕf
=
(
fx
ff
) 1−ρ
ρ
(
τ(ϕx)
∆(ϕx)− 1
)1−ρ(
ϕfη
1
1−2ρ
1
1− 2ρ [1 + lf (ϕf )]
2−2ρ
2ρ−1
dlf (ϕf )
dϕf
+
1
τ(lf )
)
Since it was assumed that η > 1 and ρ > 1/2, the only term in the above expression
whose sign is not immediately clear is
dlf (ϕf )
dϕf
. The intuition for why
dlf
dϕ
< 0 at ϕ = ϕf
is as follows. A higher ϕf means that for foreign hiring to be profitable, a higher firm
productivity level is required, so less firms hire abroad in equilibrium. Then for a firm
with ϕ ≥ ϕf , it is still profitable to hire workers from abroad and now the foreign
labor market is less tight, making it easier for them to hire foreign workers. Therefore,
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the measure of foreign workers hired by a firm with ϕ > ϕf would not decrease if ϕf
increased. Therefore, I conclude that
dlf (ϕf )
dϕf
≥ 0 . Since η > 1 and ρ > 1/2, all other
terms are also positive, implying that
dϕx(ϕf )
dϕf
> 0. It was shown that ϕx increases
after liberalization, and therefore ϕf does as well. Thus, trade liberalization causes
all productivity cutoff levels to.
Effects of Trade Liberalization on Wages and Unemployment
I now analyze how wages respond to trade liberalization. As was described above in
the general equilibrium section of this paper, both the domestic and foreign wages,
wd and wf , unambiguously increase in response to an increase in the cutoff produc-
tivities, irrespective of firm productivity. The reason for this is that higher cutoff pro-
ductivities imply only the most productive firms survive in equilibrium, and workers
employed by these firms are compensated more. Hence, the increase in productivity
levels that occurs with trade liberalization (described in the previous section) causes
the wages of both domestic and foreign workers to unambiguously increase. It is worth
noting that the increase in wages affected by trade liberalization does not necessarily
result in an increase in expected worker income ω because of frictions in the labor
market: from (20) we can see that the positive effect on expected worker income of
the increase in wages, may be counteracted by a decrease in labor market tightness.
For i, k  {H,F} and k 6= i, the sectoral unemployment rate in the domestic and
foreign labor markets and the total sectoral unemployment rate in country i, denoted
uid, u
i
f , and u
i respectively, are given by
uid ≡ 1− xid = 1−
ωi
wid
, uif ≡ 1− xif = 1−
ωi
wkf
(3.38)
ui ≡ 1− xi = U
i
d
U i
uid +
U if
U i
uif
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Recall that xid and x
i
f denote the market tightness of the domestic and foreign
labor markets in country i, and were defined in (9). Equations (42) show that the
total unemployment rate in country i is a weighted average of the unemployment
rates in the domestic and foreign labor markets in that country, where the weights
are simply the proportion of all unemployed workers looking for employment in each
labor market.
I now analyze the effects on the sectoral unemployment rate of liberalization under
the framework I have outlined above. Using the results from sectoral equilibrium, it
will be seen that, like in Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010), there are two
channels through which liberalization affects change in the sectoral unemployment,
which I call the expected income and wage effects. The latter of these channels is
substantially different in Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010); in fact, it is not
really a wage effect at all.
The first channel through which the openness of a country affects its sectoral
unemployment rate is through the worker’s expected income ω. Recall from the
general equilibrium analysis that expected worker income is increasing in both the
domestic wage wd and the domestic cutoff productivity level ϕd. Also recall that when
a country experiences liberalization, both ϕd and wd increase. Hence, liberalization
also increases expected worker income ω. From (42) it can then be seen this increase
in ω, ceteris paribus, reduces the sectoral unemployment rate u. This is the first
channel through which liberalization affects the sectoral unemployment rate, and is
present in the analysis of Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010).
The second channel – which I call the wage effect on unemployment – through
which liberalization affects the unemployment rate of a country differs from that of
Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010), and represents the contribution of this paper.
As was shown above, liberalization causes an increase in the average productivity
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of surviving firms, and hence, the cutoff productivities (ϕd in particular) increase.
From (18), we can see that both wages are a function of the productivity cutoffs, i.e.
wd = wd(ϕd, ϕf ) and wf = wf (ϕd, ϕf ). The increase in both ϕd and ϕf that results
from liberalization causes the wages to increase. The reason for this is that higher
cutoff productivities mean that the average productivities of firms who produce and
export in equilibrium are higher. This higher productivity implies that workers will
be compensated more, hence the higher wages. From (19) and (33), this then implies
that the tightness in both the domestic and foreign labor markets decreases, and the
sectoral unemployment rate increases in both the domestic and foreign labor markets.
The increase in wd and wf causes the sectoral unemployment rate in the domestic
labor market ud and that of the foreign labor market uf to increase, respectively. As
a result, the total sectoral unemployment rate u increases. Thus, this second effect
of liberalization on the sectoral unemployment rate is realized entirely through the
effect of opening to trade on wages.
The reason that the expected income and wage effects can be separated in this
model is a direct result of labor market frictions. If there were no frictions, an
increase in wages that results from liberalization would cause expected worker income
to increase as well– the two variables would move in the same direction. However, the
presence of labor market frictions implies that these variables need not be perfectly
correlated: indeed, expected worker income depends on labor market tightness as
much as it does the wage.
An important result from this analysis is that the literature may understate the
positive wage effect of trade on unemployment. In particular, the wage effect on
unemployment is exacerbated by the increase in the wage of foreign workers wf . The
drop in market tightness of the foreign labor market induced by trade liberalization
strengthens the positive effect on the unemployment rate. Jobless workers who would
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have been hired by less productive firms before liberalization, are now left unemployed
because of the smaller availability of jobs. The wage effects on the unemployment
rate under this framework imply that the change in the unemployment rate after
liberalization is even greater when the model allows for foreign hiring. Hence, models
which ignore foreign hiring of labor underestimate the effects of liberalization on
unemployment.
In Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010), there are two sources of unemploy-
ment. A worker is unemployed either because he is not matched with a firm or
because the match-specific productivity is below the threshold. The latter source of
unemployment comes from the fact that there are complementarities between firm
and worker productivity. As a result, firms have incentive to screen workers (after
contacting them but before hiring them) to retrieve information about what their con-
tribution to total firm productivity would be. This yields a threshold match-specific
productivity below which the firm does not hire the worker. Workers who are not
hired remain unemployed; hence this second source of unemployment originates from
the hiring rate. In summary, more intensive screening that results from an opening
to trade reduces the hiring rate, thereby increasing the unemployment rate.
However, in this model, productivity is entirely firm-specific, and so the second
source of unemployment that exists in Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010) de-
scribed above is absent this model. Although unemployment is modeled more parsi-
moniously, this allows me to build a tractable model of cross-border hiring, yielding a
more comprehensive picture of unemployment. The lack of match-specific productiv-
ity means there is no incentive for firms to screen workers that they contact. Indeed,
workers are homogeneous. Therefore, any worker contacted by a firm is hired: the
hiring rate is one for all firms. Accordingly, a worker is unemployed only because he
is not matched with a firm. If a firm’s productivity is below the domestic production
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threshold ϕd, it immediately exits the market and does not produce. Of course, firms
that do not produce do not hire labor, and so firm exit that occurs due to a low pro-
ductivity draw naturally affects market tightness: less workers are hired, increasing
the sectoral unemployment rate. Thus, this framework yields two channels through
trade liberalization affects the sectoral unemployment rate, each of which has an op-
posing effect. Therefore, the overall effect of liberalization on the unemployment rate
is ambiguous.
While this ambiguity is consistent with the lack of consensus regarding the rela-
tionship between unemployment and trade (see Davidson and Matusz (2009)), a rea-
sonable parameterization would yield a strong prediction of the qualitative response
of the overall unemployment rate to liberalization. If the proportional increase in
the domestic and foreign wage is greater than that of expected worker income, then
the net effect on the unemployment rate of the domestic and foreign labor markets,
respectively, is positive. The magnitude of these changes ultimately determines the
overall effect on the country’s total unemployment rate. Clearly, the parameterization
of the model is central to determining the qualitative response of unemployment to
liberalization which, in principle, could be determined by performing counterfactuals,
given a reasonable parameterization. Hence, this paper produces a framework which
can yield a precise and comprehensive prediction of the response of the unemployment
rate to trade liberalization.
3.3 Conclusion
In this paper, I develop a novel framework for examining the relationship between
international trade and unemployment, which incorporates cross-border hiring by
firms. I show that there are two channels through which trade liberalization affects
unemployment. The first is through the expected income of a worker in the country:
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trade liberalization pushes the unemployment rate down through a rise in expected
worker income. The second result of this paper is that trade liberalization pushes
the unemployment rate up via a rise in wages. Jobless workers who would have been
hired by less productive firms before liberalization, are now left unemployed because
of the smaller availability of jobs.
By allowing for cross-border hiring, I obtain a more comprehensive and descriptive
picture of the effects of trade liberalization on unemployment. This framework is
tractable and demonstrates that cross-border hiring has significant implications for
the magnitude of the response of unemployment to trade liberalization. Cross-border
hiring enhances the quantitative effect of liberalization on unemployment. The fact
that the unemployment rate in a country depends in part on the hiring behavior of
foreign firms magnifies the wage effect on unemployment. Hence, the framework I
outline in this paper shows that cross-border hiring enhances the sensitivity of the
unemployment rate to liberalization. Thus, this paper demonstrates that models in
the literature which ignore cross-border hiring likely underestimate the upward force
of trade liberalization on unemployment.
This paper also outlines conditions on the model parameters under which the qual-
itative response of the unemployment rate to liberalization will be positive. Hence,
this paper lends itself to future research by laying the foundation for future calibra-
tion exercises and empirical surveys to make definitive conclusions about the model
predictions, and the relationship between international trade and unemployment.
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Appendix
A1. Agency Problem
Each firm has some ability to enforce debt repayment. Firm i can pledge at most θi,i−1
fraction of its end-of-period revenue repay the trade credit τi−1 from its supplier. If
the firm repudiates the trade credit contract, it loses θipixi, and keeps the remainder
for itself. To protect itself from this possibility, the supplier i − 1 takes care that
the loan size does not incentivize its customer to repudiate the contract. Thus, there
is an incentive constraint on the trade credit from i − 1 to i, which states that the
payoff to i of repudiating the contract does not exceed the payoff of collecting all of
its receivables and paying the trade debt.
(1− θi)pixi ≤ pixi − τi−1
Rearranging terms, I call this firm i’s borrowing constraint.
τi−1 ≤ θipixi (3.39)
Since trade credit must satisfy this constraint, firms never have enough incentive to
default on their trade credit contracts in equilibrium.
A2. Borrowing and Lending Decisions
(The following results hold for an infinite horizon setting). Let δ denote the rate at
which the firm discounts end-of-period payouts, and let rR, rP , and rB respectively
denote the interest rates on accounts receivables, accounts payables, and bank debt.
Let di0 and di1 respectively denote the payout to the firm at the beginning and end
of the period. It follows that
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di0 = pixi − τi − (pi−1xi−1 − τi−1)− wni + bi
di1 = τi
(
1 + rR
)− τi−1 (1 + rP )− bi (1 + rB)
At the beginning of the period, the firm must make a net cash payment of pi−1xi−1−
τi−1 to its supplier, and wni to the household. In addition, it receives a cash-in-
advance payment of pixi − τi from its customer along with a cash loan bi from the
bank. At the end of the period, firm i must repay its loans with interest, and receives
repayment for its trade credit with interest.
The firm’s objective is to choose how much to borrow from its supplier and the
bank, and how much to lend to its customer to maximize its discounted payout.
Because the firm is a price-taker, it does not internalize the effect that its borrowing
and lending decisions have on the demand it faces from its customer, nor does it
internalize its supplier’s liquidity needs. Therefore, the problem of the firm is to
choose τi−1, τi, and bi taking prices and quantities of output as given, to maximize
its discounted payouts subject to its borrowing constraints.
max
τi−1, τi, bi
di0 + δdi1
s.t. τi−1 ≤ θipixi
bi ≤ Bipixi + ατi
The firm’s first order conditions are
δ
(
1 + rR
)
+ αλB = 1
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δ
(
1 + rP
)
+ λτ = 1
δ
(
1 + rB
)
+ λB = 1
where λτ and λB denote the shadow values of trade and bank credit, respectively.
Suppose that the interest rates for accounts payables and receivables are equal, so
that rR = rP . Then it follows that
λτ = αλB
Because α ≥ 0, we have that λτ > 0 if and only if λB > 0. In words, firm i’s
trade credit borrowing constraint is binding if and only if its bank credit constraint
is binding.
Now suppose that 1
δ
> 1 + rB. (A sufficient condition for this is that rB = 0 and
δ < 1.) This implies that λB > 0. Intuitively, if the interest rate on bank debt is
sufficiently low, then the firm will always want to borrow more from the bank, and
the bank borrowing constraint always binds. In equilibrium, all firms are maxing out
their bank credit, and borrowing the maximum from their suppliers and lending the
maximum to their customers. Under these conditions, each firm will want to borrow
the maximum from its supplier and lend the maximum to its customer because the
interest paid on trade debt is same as that received on trade credit, and the firm can
relax its bank borrowing constraint because trade credit is collateralizable.
In reality, firms often collateralize their accounts receivable to borrow from finan-
cial intermediaries. Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) also find that this assumption is
critical to explain why liquidity-constrained firms often grant delayed payment terms
to their customers. Omiccioli (2005) examines empirically the prevalence of collat-
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eralizing trade credit using data on Italian firms. In the remainder of the paper,
I assume that δ < 1 and rR = rP = rB = 0 for simplicity. These conditions are
sufficient that all firm borrowing constraints bind in equilibrium.
Nevertheless, binding borrowing constraints are not critical for the results. The
qualitative results go through for sufficiently large liquidity shocks, even when bor-
rowing constraints are not binding in equilibrium. As for the quantitative results, I
assess how sensitive they are to these assumptions by checking their robustness to
varying the value of α. The results are summarized in the text.
A3. Simple Model Solution
Solved in closed-form recursively, starting with the final firm in the chain, firm M.
Firm M
Recall that firm M collects none of its sales from the household up front (does
not give the household any trade credit, \tau M=0). Then its problem is to choose
its input purchases, loan from the bank, and the trade credit loan from M-1, to
maximize its profits, subject to its cash-in-advance, supplier borrowing, and bank
borrowing constraints.
max
nM ,xM−1,bM ,τM−1
pMxM − wnM − pM−1xM−1
s.t. wnM + pM−1xM−1 ≤ bM + τM−1 + pMxM − τM
bM ≤ BMpMxM + ατM
τM−1pM−1xM−1 ≤ θM,M−1pMxM
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Recall that the firm does not collect any cash-in-advance from the household, so
that its trade credit τM = 0. Also recall that its borrowing constraints () and () bind
in equilibrium, so that the problem can be rewritten
max
nM ,xM−1,bM ,τM−1
pMxM − wnM − pM−1xM−1
s.t. wnM + pM−1xM−1 ≤ χMpMxM
where
χM = θM,M−1 +BM
Notice that χM is given by exogenous parameters.
If firm M is unconstrained in equilibrium, then the optimality conditions equate
the marginal cost of each type of input with the marginal revenue.
w = ηM
pMxM
nM
(3.40)
pM−1 = (1− ηM)pMxM
xM−1
(3.41)
Firm M’s expenditure in inputs is then
wnM + pM−1xM−1 = (ηM + (1− ηM)) pMxM (3.42)
Then firm 3 is then unconstrained in equilibrium if and only if its expenditure at its
unconstrained optimum is less than its liquidity at this optimum.
pMxM < χMpMxM (3.43)
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i.e.
χM > 1
If firm M is constrained in equilibrium, then its binding cash-in-advance pins down
its level of output. The only choice left to make is how much labor to hire nM versus
how much intermediate goods xM−1 to purchase, given its level of output xM . Because
χM is independent of M’s choice of nM and xM−1, the problem of maximizing profits
subject to the binding cash-in-advance is equivalent to minimizing its expenditure
nM + xM−1 subject to producing xM . Thus, it solves the following cost-minimization
problem.
minnM , xM−1 wnM + pM−1xM−1
s.t. xM = zMn
ηM
M x
(1−ηM )
M−1
Then firm M’s optimality condition equates the ratio of expenditure on each input
with the ratio of each input’s share in production.
wnM
pM−1xM−1
=
ηM
(1− ηM) (3.44)
Using this, we can rewrite M’s binding cash-in-advance as
wnM
(
1 +
(1− ηM)
ηM
)
= χMpMxM (3.45)
Rearranging yields
w = ηMχM
pMxM
nM
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Combining () with its analog () in the unconstrained case, we can see that
• if χM > rM (i.e. if firm i is unconstrained in equilibrium)
w = ηM
pMxM
nM
• otherwise
w = ηMχM
pMxM
nM
These two cases imply that we can write
w = φMηM
pMxM
nM
(3.46)
where
φM ≡ min {1, χM}
φM represents the distortion in firm M’s optimal labor usage due to its cash-in-
advance. Financial frictions introduce wedge between firm’s marginal benefit and cost
of production. The wedge between these two objects is increasing in the tightness
χM of M’s constraint, and decreasing in the returns-to-scale of firm M’s production
function.
Firm M-1
Given firm M’s solution, we can proceed to firm M-1’s problem.
maxnM−1,xM−2,τM−2 pM−1xM−1 − wnM−1 − pM−2xM−2
s.t. wnM−1 + pM−2xM−2 ≤ χM−1pM−1xM−1
where
101
χM−1 = θM−1,M−2 +BM−1 + 1− (1− α) τM
pM−1xM−1
The binding borrowing constraint implies
χM−1 = θM−1,M−2 +BM−1 + 1− (1− α)θM,M−1pMxM
pM−1xM−1
And () and () imply that pMxM
pM−1xM−1
= 1
φMωM,M−1(1−ηM ) . Therefore,
χM−1 = θM−1,M−2 +BM−1 + 1− α θM,M−1
φM(1− ηM)
Since φM is given by (), this is a closed-form expression for χM−1. Note that, since
φM depends on χM , χM−1 is an increasing function of χM ; this interdependence of
cash-in-advances comes from the trade credit relationship between M and M-1.
Given χM−1, the solution to firm M-1’s problem takes the same form as that of
firm M. (Note that χM−1 does not depend directly on M-1’s choice of nM−1 versus
xM−2. Therefore, when constrained in equilibrium, M-1 will solve the analogous cost-
minimization problem as M to maximize profits.) The cash-in-advance places a wedge
φM−1 between the marginal benefit of hiring labor and the marginal cost
w = φM−1ηM−1
pM−1xM−1
nM−1
Given the above expressions for χM−1 and χM , the the wedge φM−1 = min1, χM−1 is
a closed-form expression.
Equilibrium: Each other firm’s problem is symmetric. Continuing recursively, I
obtain the closed-form solution for each firm. To summarize, I have, for each firm i
w = φiηi
pixi
ni
where
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φi = min{1, χi} and χi = Bi + θi + 1− θi+1 1
φi+1ωi,i−1(1− ηi)
Market clearing conditions are given by
C = Y ≡ xM , N =
M∑
i=1
ni
Given these expressions, the task is to write each ni as a function of aggregate
output xM , starting with firm M-1. From the firm optimality conditions, we have the
following three expressions:
wnM−1 = φM−1ηM−1pM−1xM−1, wnM = φMηMpMxM , pM−1xM−1 = wnM
(1− ηM)
ηM
Combining these yields nM−1 as a function of xM .
wnM−1 = φMφM−1ηM−1ωM,M−1(1− ηM)pMxM
Continuing recursively, we can write ni as a function of xM , for each i (LEFT OFF
HERE)
wni = pMxM
(
M∏
j=i
φj
)(
M−1∏
j=i
ωj+1,j(1− ηj)
)
ηi
The household’s preferences and optimality conditions imply
w =
V ′(N)
U ′(xM)
= xM
Let good M be the numeraire. Combining () with () yields a closed-form expression
for each firm’s labor use.
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ni = ηi
M∏
j=i+
ωj,j−1(1− ηj)φj
Recall that the production functions imply that aggregate output can be written
Then () and () yield a closed-form expression for aggregate output.
A4. Production Influence Vector
v¯ =

v1 v2 v3 · · · vM
0 v1 v2
0 0 v1
...
. . .
0 0 0 v1
 1Mx1
vi=η˜i captures downstream propagation (supply effects). But misses upstream
demand effects. Total effect is sum
∑i
j=1 vi
v′ =
[
η1
M∏
k=2
(1− ηk)ωk,k−1 · · · ηj
M∏
k=j+1
(1− ηk)ωk,k−1 · · · ηM
]
=
A5. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof: From the definition of χi (4) and the unnumbered equation after
(6), we have
φi = min
{
1,
1
ri
(
Bi + θi,i−1 − θi+1,i 1
φi+1ωi+1,i(1− ηi+1)
)}
Here, ri = 1 denotes firm i’s returns-to-scale. It follows that
d φi−1
dBi
=

1
ri
αθi,i−1
φiωi,i−1(1−ηi) > 0 if φi−1 < 1
0 otherwise
d φj
dBi
= 0 ∀ j > i and d φj
dBi
=
1
ri
> 0 for j = i
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Putting these cases together, we can write
d log φj
dBi
for any j.
d log φj
dBi
=

1
ri
> 0 if j = i
1
φj
1
rj
θkj
φkωkj(1−ηk)
d φk
dBi
≥ 0 ∀ k if j < i
0 otherwise
It follows that
d log φj
dBi
≥ 0 and d
d θij
(
d log φj
dBi
)
≥ 0.
A6. Solution Procedure in General Model
Claim: solution procedure takes same form in general model as in stylized.
Firm i’s problem is to maximize profits subject to its cash-in-advance.
maxni,{xis}sI pixi − wni −
M∑
s=1
psxis
wni +
M∑
s=1
psxis ≤ χipixi
where χi denotes the tightness of i’s cash-in-advance.
χi = Bi +
M∑
s=1
θis + 1− α
M∑
c=1
θci
pcxc
pixi
If firm i is unconstrained in equilibrium, i . Consider the case when i is constrained
in equilibrium. For profit maximization to be equivalent to minimizing its expenditure
subject to producing xi, we must have that χi is independent of i’s choice of ni and
xis for each s (or that firm i does not internalize these effects). First, suppose that χi
is independent of this choice. I will later verify that this indeed the case.
Firm i’s solution takes the same form as in the simple version of the model. The
equilibrium system of M2 + 5M + 2 nonlinear equations (for every i and j)
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xi = z
ηi
i n
ηi
i
(
m∏
j=1
x
ωij
ij
)1−ηi
φi = min
{
1 ,
1
ri
(
Bi +
M∑
s=1
θis + 1−
M∑
c=1
θci
pcxc
pixi
)}
M∑
i=1
cβii = N
1+
ni = φiηi
pi
w
xi xij = φi (1− ηi)ωij pi
pj
xi
pici
pjcj
=
βi
βj
p1 = 1
N =
M∑
i=1
ni xi = ci +
M∑
c=1
xci
M2 + 5M + 2 unknowns
{{ni, ci , xi, {xij}jI , φi, pi}iI , N, w}
I now verify that χi is independent of i’s choice of ni and xis for all s. Note that
pcxc
pixi
=
pcxc
pixci
pixci
pixi
=
θci
φc (1− ηc)ωciνci
where the second equality follows from firm c’s optimality condition for intermediate
good i, and from the definition of νci. The term
1
φc(1−ηc)ωci represents the inverse of
firm c’s demand for good i, and is independent of i’s choice of ni versus xis. The term
νci represents firm c’s share of i’s total output, and is determined by each customer
c’s optimal behavior. Thus, firm i’s choice of intermediates vs labor doesn’t (directly)
affect χi. This verifies the conjecture that, when constrained, profit maximization is
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equivalent to expenditure minimization.
A7. Log-Linearized System
Stars are point around which system is approximated. Calibrated equilibrium values.
For all i and j
In order: firm i’s optimality condition for input j, firm i’s optimality condition
for labor, definition of wedge phi i, household optimality condition for consumption
of each good, market clearing for good i, production function for firm i, household
budget constraint, labor market clearing condition, household optimality for labor
versus aggregate consumption.
p˜j + x˜ij = φ˜i + p˜i + x˜i w˜ + n˜i = φ˜i + p˜i + x˜i φ˜i =

φ˜i
c
if φi < 1
0 otherwise
φ˜i
c
=
Bi
riφi
B˜i +
α
riφi
M∑
c=1
θciνci
φc(1− ηc)ωci φ˜c −
α
riφi
M∑
c=1
θciνci
φc(1− ηc)ωci ν˜ci
p˜i+c˜i = p˜j+c˜j x˜i =
(
pic
∗
i
pix∗i
)
c˜i+
∑
c
(
pix
∗
ci
pix∗i
)
x˜ci x˜i = z˜i+ηin˜i+(1− ηi)
∑
s
ωisx˜is
w˜ =
∑
i
βi (c˜i + p˜i)
∑
i
(
n∗i
N
)
n˜i = 0 (1 + ) N˜ =
∑
i
βic˜i
A8. Counterfactual
Recall the definition of φi
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φi = min
{
1,
1
ri
(
Bi +
M∑
s=1
θis + 1− α
M∑
c=1
θci
pcxc
pixi
)}
Replace pcxc
pixi
with firm c’s optimality conditions for good i yields
φi = min
{
1,
1
ri
(
Bi +
M∑
s=1
θis + 1− α
M∑
c=1
θci
φc(1− ηc)ωciνci
)}
Log-linearizing φi yields
φ˜i =

(
B∗i
r∗i φ
∗
i
)
B˜i +
α
r∗i φ
∗
i
∑M
c=1
(
θci
φ∗c (1−ηc)ωci
)
φ˜c if φ∗i < 1
0 otherwise
Thus, in the full model wedges respond endogenously to direct liquidity shocks
Bi and to changes in its customers’ wedges φc through the credit linkage channel.
This second term captures the propagation due to the credit linkages between firms.
In performing my counterfactual, I compute the response in GDP to athe aggregate
liquidity shock B tilde=.01 for all i, and then do the same by after imposing
φ˜i =

(
B∗i
r∗i φ
∗
i
)
B˜i if φ
∗
i < 1
0 otherwise
This latter exercise gives me the model’s response without propagation via the
credit network. Then the marginal contribution to the change in GDP of including
the credit linkages is given by the difference in ...
A9. Effect of Credit Linkages in General Model
Effect of Credit Linkages in General Model. In the model the trade credit parameters
θcs show up only in the wedges φi. Therefore, to see effect of credit network in
propagating liquidity and productivity shocks, it suffices to show how φi responds to
shocks to other industries. Recall
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φi = min
{
1,
χi
ri
}
where
χi = Bi +
M∑
s=1
θis + 1− α
M∑
c=1
θci
pcxc
pixi
= Bi +
M∑
s=1
θis + 1− α
M∑
c=1
θci
pcxc
pixci
xci
xi
Let νci ≡ xcixi represent the share of c in i’s total revenue. Substituting c’s optimality
condition for good i in for pcxc
pixci
yields
χi = Bi +
M∑
s=1
θis + 1− α
M∑
c=1
θci
φc(1− ηc)ωciνci
The response in φi to some shock can be summarized by the log-linearized expres-
sion for φi.
φ˜i =

φ˜i
c
if φi < 1
0 otherwise
where
φ˜i
c
=
Bi
riφi
B˜i +
α
riφi
M∑
c=1
θciνci
φc(1− ηc)ωci φ˜c −
α
riφi
M∑
c=1
θciνci
φc(1− ηc)ωci ν˜ci
and
ν˜ci = x˜ci − x˜i
This expression says that industry i’s wedge can change either from direct liquidity
shock to i (given by B˜i), changes in the wedges of customers (given by φ˜i) through
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credit linkages θci, or changes in the composition of industry i’s sales (given by ν˜ci for
all customers c), also through credit linkages.
Liquidity Shock to j Consider first a liquidity shock to industry j, given by B˜j < 0.
How does this affect φi, and how does this effect depend on i’s credit linkages with
j? From (), we can see that there are two effects. First, the shock reduces φj, so that
φ˜j < 0. This pushes φi down. Second, because i has M customers, xji falls by more
than xi falls. Therefore, j’s share of i’s output νji falls, and ν˜ji < 0. This pushes φi
up. The stronger is j’s downstream credit linkage θji with i, the stronger are both of
these effects.
But there is a more indirect way by which φi changes in response to B˜j < 0. The
initial fall in φi is transmitted to each of i’s customers c as a supply shock, causing all
c to cut back on output. Then the fall in pcxc causes φc to fall, as the amount of credit
c is giving per unit of its revenue is lower. Since all industries are interconnected,
industry c is also industry i’s customer. As a result, the fall in φc causes φi to fall
via the credit linkage from i to c. This fall in φi effect is increasing in i’s downstream
linkage with c θci. Thus, the greater θci for all c, i.e. the larger i’s credit out-degree,
the more that φi will respond to the shock to j, and the larger will be the aggregate
impact.
Productivity Shock to j Now consider an adverse productivity shock to industry
j, given by z˜j < 0. This shock affects neither φj nor φi directly. However, it has
an indirect affect on φi through the composition of i’s sales νji. In particular j’s
share of i’s total output νji falls, and so ν˜ji < 0. This reduces the amount of trade
credit per dollar of revenue that i is giving its customers, and so i’s wedge increases:
φ˜i > 0. This effect is increasing in i’s downstream credit linkage with j, θji. Therefore,
stronger credit linkages mitigate the impact of the productivity shock. This effect is
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not present in the stylized model, because νji = 1 for j = i+ 1 and 0 for all other j;
there is no change in the composition of i’s sales. Nevertheless, this mitigation effect
is quantitatively small, as discussed in the quantitative analysis.
A10. Identification of Productivity vs. Liquidity Shocks
Recall the production functions, optimality conditions for labor use, and definition
of the wedges. First, the employment and output of an industry are linked by the
industry production function xit = zitn
ηi
it
(∏M
s=1 x
ωis
ist
)1−ηi
. Therefore, a change in the
TFP of industry i is given by
z˜it = x˜it − ηin˜it − (1− ηi)
M∑
s=1
ωitx˜ist
The constant returns-to-scale of industry i’s production function implies that if an
observed change in industry i’s output x˜it from period t − 1 to t exceeds that of
nηiit
(∏M
s=1 x
ωis
ist
)1−ηi
, then there must have been an increase increase in i’s TFP such
that z˜it > 0.
Industry i’s optimality condition for labor equates the ratio of its wage bill to
revenue with labor’s marginal product, times the wedge, i.e. wni
pixi
= ηiφi. In log-
changes from period t− 1 to t, this can be written as
w˜t + n˜it − p˜it − x˜it = φ˜it
This says that an observed change in industry i’s ratio of labor expenditure to revenue
from time t− 1 to t, must have come from a change in the firm’s wedge φ˜it from t− 1
to t.
Finally, recall the definition of industry i’s wedge.
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φi = min
{
1,
1
ri
(
Bi +
M∑
s=1
θis + 1− (1− α)
M∑
c=1
θci
φc(1− ηc)ωciνci
)}
This implies that a change in industry i’s wedges must be driven by changes in
liquidity, either directly shock to Bi, or through credit linkages via φc. In this way,
the model attributes a change in the ratio of industry i’s wage bill to revenue to a
liquidity shock. In a later section, I discuss the extent to which the model’s predicted
liquidity shocks are correlated with some industry-level measures of credit spreads, an
indication of changes in liquidity conditions computed from an independent dataset.
Because the model can track how a liquidity shock or productivity shock to one
industry spills over to other industries via their credit and input-output linkages,
the model can back out exactly how much of a change in an industry’s output and
employment is coming from spillover effects versus a direct shock, and can identify the
industry which was shocked. In this manner, for any combination of 2M observations
x˜it and n˜it, the model exactly identifies the sequence of liquidity and productivity
shocks B˜it and z˜it faced by each industry between periods t− 1 and t.
A11. Aggregate Volatility
Recall that the growth in industry output can be written as a function of the industry
liquidity and productivity shocks. Recall that Xt is a vector of the percentage change
x˜it in each industry’s output at time t.
Xt = GXBt +HXzt
And the shocks Bt and zt, in turn, are composed of an aggregate and idiosyncratic
components.
Bt = ΛBF
B
t + ut F
B
t = γBF
B
t−1 + ι
B
t
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zt = ΛzF
z
t + vt F
z
t = γzF
z
t−1 + ι
z
t
Then letting ΣXX denote the variance-covariance matrix of Xt (and similarly for the
other variables), we have
ΣXX = GXΣBBG
′
X +HXΣzzH
′
X
ΣBB = ΛBΣ
B
FFΛ
′
B + Σuu
Σzz = ΛzΣ
z
FFΛ
′
z + Σvv
where Σuu and Σvv are diagonal matrices.
Aggregate manufacturing output at time t is defined as Σixit. Let s¯t denote the
vector of industry shares of aggregate output at time t. Then the growth of aggregate
output at time t is given by
s¯tXt
Suppose that industry shares don’t fluctuate much over time, so that s¯t ≈ s¯ for
all t. Then growth in aggregate output at time t can be approximated by s¯Xt.
Then the variance of aggregate output, i.e. aggregate volatility in the economy, is
approximately given by
σ2 ≡ s¯′ΣXX s¯ = s¯′GXΣBBG′X s¯+ s¯′HXΣzzH ′X s¯
Then the contribution of aggregate liquidity shocks to aggregate volatility is given
by
113
s¯′GX
(
ΛBΣ
B
FFΛ
′
B
)
G′X s¯
σ2
And the aggregate volatility generated by the credit network in propagating aggregate
liquidity shocks is then given by
where GNoTC maps Bt into Xt when the credit linkage channel is shut-off. Similar
expressions can be derived for the contribution to aggregate volatility of idiosyncratic
liquidity shocks, and aggregate and idiosyncratic liquidity shocks.
A14. Construction of Proxy for Inter-Industry Credit Flows
For each firm in the sample, I want a measure of its cost of goods sold (COGS)
financed with accounts payable (AP) in each year t, which I call its payables financing
(PayFin) at time t. Since a firm may repay its accounts payable irregularly, simply
taking the ratio APt
COGSt
may in part reflect a spuriously high or low repayment of its
accounts payable in that year. Therefore, I take a take a moving average of AP to
smooth it over time. Thus, I compute firm f ’s payables financing at time t as
PayFinf,t =
.5 (APf,t−1 + APf,t)
COGSf,t
I do this only for years in which there is data for both AP and COGS for each
firm. I obtain a firm-level measure of payables financing by taking the median of
PayFinf,t across time, to minimize effect of outliers and get a representative firm-
level estimate of the average COGS financed with trade credit. Then to get an
industry-level measure of payables financing, I take the median of PayFinf across all
firms f in each three-digit level NAICS industry. In this way, I obtain a measure of
payables financing for each of my industries.
Raddatz (2010) uses this industry-level measure of PayFin to construct qij. How-
ever, since he only uses AP data, he must impose that qij = qik for all j, k. In other
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words, he assumes that each industry finances the same fraction of purchases with
trade credit, across all of its suppliers. This is a fairly strong assumption that he is
forced to make due to the paucity of data on trade credit. However, I improve on
this proxy by making use of additional data on accounts receivables to obtain a more
precise and industry-pair-specific measure of qij.
In particular, I construct an industry-level measure of the fraction of total sales
made on credit to customers, which I call the industry’s receivables lending (RecLend),
using each firm’s accounts receivable (AR) and sales each year.
RecLendf,t =
.5 (ARf,t−1 + ARf,t)
Salesf,t
I then aggregate across time and across firms in each industry to obtain an industry-
level measure of receivables lending.
The measure PayFini tells me how much trade credit each industry i receives from
all of its suppliers collectively; it does not tell me how this breaks down across each
of its suppliers. Similarly, RecLendi tells me how much trade credit each industry
i gives to all of its customers collectively; it does not tell me how this breaks down
across each of its customers. Therefore, to construct qij the fraction of industry j’s
sales to industry i made on trade credit, I take a weighted average of PayFini and
RecLendj. In the next section, I consider two weighting schemes and compare their
aggregate accuracy. My baseline proxy uses weights given by each industry’s total
sales.
qˆij = kijPayFini + kjiRecLendj , kij ≡ pixi
pixi + pjxj
Therefore, a larger industry will carry more weight in determining the trade credit
flows to and from it. Alternative weighting schemes, such as equal weights to both
cusomer and supplier, do not significantly alter the results. Given my proxy qˆij,
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inter-industry trade credit flows are then proxied as
τˆij = qˆijpjxij
In the Appendix, I discuss the conditions under which the weighting scheme kij
described above is optimal for constructing the proxy of trade credit flows. Intuitively,
this weighting scheme minimizes the mean squared errors in the observed accounts
payables of each industry, when I impose the restriction that any given industry’s
lending or borrowing not vary greatly across suppliers or customers.
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